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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The legal gender status of millions of people in the United States1 is 
 
 1. The exact incidence of intersexualism and transsexualism is unknown.  Only 
rough estimates are available on the number of intersexuals and transsexuals in the 
United States.  Recent estimates of the frequency of intersexuality are in the range of one 
percent of the population.  See ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER 
POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 51, 53 tbl.3.2 (2000) (estimating that 
1.7% of the world’s population are born with some form of intersexuality and noting that 
the frequency of intersexuality is much higher in some populations than in others); see 
also ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX 
42 (1998) (estimating that about one to three in every two thousand people born in the 
United States have anatomies that are neither typically male nor female).  Such 
frequency makes intersexuality about as common as cystic fibrosis (“roughly one in two 
thousand ‘Caucasian’ births”) and Down syndrome (“roughly one in eight hundred live 
births”).  Id. at 43. 
The incidence of transsexualism is even more difficult to estimate.  A 1990 study 
estimated that about ten thousand transsexuals live in the United States.  See DAVID W. 
MEYERS, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW 221 (2d ed. 1990).  However, a weekly 
magazine recently reported that there are roughly thirty thousand transsexuals in the 
United States.  Alex Tresniowski et al., Split Heirs, PEOPLE, Aug. 28, 2000, at 75–76.  
Approximately one thousand sex reassignment surgeries (SRS) are performed in North 
America each year.  See E-mail from Nancy Cain, Executive Director, International 
Foundation for Gender Education (IFGE), to Shana Brown (Aug. 21, 2000, 12:59:42) 
(on file with author).  Cain offered an explanation for the lack of statistical information 
regarding transsexuals: 
The problem is that the “advice” which was given to transsexuals was to 
“blend in”—so it’s not like people are including this information on their 
census forms. . . .  The other piece is that once a transsexual person has had 
surgery, they often consider themselves the gender that they now are (female 
or male) and no longer identify as a “trans” anything. 
Id. 
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substantially uncertain because the law fails to answer two seemingly 
simple questions: “What is ‘female’?” and “What is ‘male’?”2 
Most Americans take for granted that the little boxes on their birth 
certificates indicating “female” or “male” were appropriately marked by 
the physician attending their birth.  However, a growing minority 
contends that the sex designation assigned at their births was either 
inaccurate at the time or is currently inaccurate.  Many states have 
amended their laws to make clear that such inaccuracies may be 
changed.3  Some states, however, may force their citizens to suffer the 
consequences of that inaccuracy for the rest of their lives. 
In many areas of the law, sexual categorization is determinative of 
individual rights.4  Whether an individual is officially recognized as a 
man or a woman decides, to a large extent, his or her fate in our society.  
Unfortunately, those who feel their gender was mistakenly identified at 
the time of their births not only have to live with the social stigmatism 
surrounding their “condition,” but also with a legal system not designed 
to interpret and apply the law to those who fall outside the “binary sex 
and gender paradigm.”5 
Arguably, the most profound consequences of a legal system based 
upon sexual categorization are felt in the area of marriage.  The United 
States Supreme Court has clearly established that the freedom to marry 
is a fundamental personal right of constitutional proportions.6  The Court 
 
 2. Katrina C. Rose discusses this “definitional void” in her article, The Transsexual 
and the Damage Done: The Fourth Court of Appeals Opens PanDOMA’s Box by 
Closing the Door on Transsexuals’ Right to Marry, 9 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 5–6 (1999–
2000). 
 3. See infra Part III.B. 
 4. Some areas in which one’s legal gender identity determines one’s rights are 
family law, prisoners’ rights, employment discrimination, military obligations, and 
athletic competition.  In addition, in Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 
1977), the court noted that “[t]he fact of sex may be crucial in school admissions, in 
vocational or recreational opportunities, in military service, in connection with insurance 
and pensions, or upon an application for a marriage certificate.”  Id. at 102. 
 5. Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the 
Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 270 (1999) [hereinafter 
Greenberg, Defining Male and Female].  Greenberg notes that “[a] variety of federal and 
state statutes and regulations” are based upon an individual’s status as male or female, 
yet “the law defines these terms inconsistently or frequently fails to define them at all.”  
Id. 
 6. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to marry is of 
fundamental importance for all individuals.”); Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 
678, 684–85 (1977) (“While the outer limits [of the right of personal privacy] have not 
been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may 
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has asserted that “the right to marry is part of the fundamental ‘right of 
privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”7  
However, although everyone has the right to marry, that right has been 
restricted by laws limiting marriage to unions between persons of the 
opposite sex,8 and courts have consistently upheld those laws.9  Such 
restrictions make transsexuals’ and intersexuals’ right to marry illusory.  
The law requires one to marry a person of the opposite sex, but without 
clear, uniform definitions of female or male, determining one’s sex is 
not necessarily a simple task.  Consequently, determining who is of the 
opposite sex can likewise be complicated.  Many transgendered individuals 
must guess as to their legal gender because an intersexual or transsexual 
can be legally categorized as a woman in one state, but a man in 
another.10  As a result, under the current law, who a transgendered 
individual may marry is subject to change as she crosses state lines. 
A recent case11 illustrates the problem transsexuals and intersexuals 
face in a legal system that does not allow same-sex marriages, but has 
failed to define female and male.  The case involves a transsexual, J’Noel 
Ball, who intended to marry a person of the opposite sex.   
Marshall Gardiner and J’Noel Ball were married on September 25, 1998, 
in Oskaloosa, Kansas.12  Gardiner died of a heart attack eleven months 
 
make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions ‘relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.’” 
(citations omitted)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) 
(“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage 
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (“[M]arriage involves 
interests of basic importance in our society.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
(“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence 
and survival.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (describing marriage as 
“essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 
190, 205 (1888) (characterizing marriage as “creating the most important relation in 
life”); see also Heather Hamilton, Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: A Critical 
Analysis of Its Constitutionality Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 47 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 943, 943 (1998). 
 7. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384. 
 8. State legislatures have passed statutes explicitly declaring same-sex marriages 
void.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (Harrison 1998 & Supp. 2000) (“No marriage 
between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as entitled to the benefits of 
marriage.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (Supp. 2000) (“Any marriage between 
persons of the same gender is prohibited and null and void from the beginning.”); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (1999) (“Marriages, whether created by common law, contracted, or 
performed outside of North Carolina, between individuals of the same gender are not 
valid in North Carolina.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baker v. 
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1996); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). 
 12. Id. at 1091; see John T. Dauner, Wealth and a Sex Change Are at Center of 
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later.13  He died intestate, leaving behind an estate worth $2.5 million.14  
After her15 husband’s death, however, a state district court held that her 
marriage was invalid because she was of the same sex as her late 
spouse.16  The court flatly refused to recognize her amended birth 
certificate as determinative of her legal sex. 
Kansas law divides the estate of an intestate decedent evenly between 
his widow and any offspring.17  Marshall’s estate was thus set to be split 
between J’Noel and Marshall’s estranged son from his previous 
marriage, Joe Gardiner.18  Shortly after his father’s death, however, Joe 
discovered that J’Noel had been born a male named Jay Ball.19  In 
Kansas, same-sex marriages are void.20  On January 20, 2000, the 
Leavenworth County probate court held that J’Noel was not entitled to 
her spousal share because her marriage to Gardiner was invalid.21 
J’Noel began her physical transformation from male to female in 
1991.22  After hormone therapy, electrolysis to remove body hair on her 
face, neck, and chest, a tracheal shave, and extensive counseling, J’Noel 
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Wisconsin in 1994.23  In this 
surgery, the doctor removed her external male genitalia and created 
female genitalia by “cut[ting] and invert[ing] the penis, [and] using part 
of the skin to form a female vagina, labia, and clitoris.”24  After her sex 
reassignment surgery, J’Noel applied for a new birth certificate that 
 
Kansas Estate Litigation, KAN. CITY STAR, June 24, 2000, at A1, available at 2000 WL 
7736247. 
 13. Devon Spurgeon, Double Bind: Woman in Missouri Is a Man in Kansas, and 
Why, WALL ST. J., Jul. 7, 2000, at A1. 
 14. Dauner, supra note 12, at A1. 
 15. Throughout this Comment, pronouns that reflect the self-identity of the 
individuals discussed are used, regardless of their legal gender identity. 
 16. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d at 1091. 
 17. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-504 (1994). 
 18. See Spurgeon, supra note 13, at A1. 
 19. See id. 
 20. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (Supp. 2000).  The statute states: “The marriage 
contract is to be considered in law as a civil contract between two parties who are of 
opposite sex.  All other marriages are declared to be contrary to the public policy of this 
state and are void.”  Id.  The statute does not define the terms “man” or “woman.”  See 
id.  Furthermore, “nowhere is there any testimony [in the legislative history] that 
specifically states that marriage should be prohibited by two parties if one is a 
postoperative male-to-female or female-to-male transsexual.”  In re Estate of Gardiner, 
22 P.3d 1086, 1093 (2001). 
 21. See Dauner, supra note 12, at A1; Spurgeon, supra note 13, at A1. 
 22. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d at 1091–92. 
 23. Id.; see also Dauner, supra note 12, at A8. 
 24. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d at 1092. 
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designated her sex as female.  Her birth certificate was reissued in 
September 1994, with the requested change pursuant to a Wisconsin 
court order.25  Despite that evidence, the Kansas probate court refused to 
recognize J’Noel’s sex as female and held that because J’Noel was born 
a male, she “remains a male for purposes of marriage under Kansas 
law.”26  The Kansas court’s ruling essentially leaves J’Noel without the 
right to enter into any marriage that would be recognized across state 
lines.27  She cannot marry a man in Kansas, and she cannot marry a 
woman in Wisconsin. 
No state in the United States currently permits same-sex marriages.28  
Although this prohibition has been attacked as violative of gays’ and 
lesbians’ constitutional right to marry, opponents of same-sex marriage 
have successfully countered that the prohibition does not violate their 
right because gays and lesbians are still free to marry partners of the 
opposite sex.29  The Gardiner case demonstrates how that argument is 
not dispositive of the transgendered community’s predicament. 
Many states, like Wisconsin, will reissue or amend transsexuals’ and 
intersexuals’ birth certificates to reflect their psychological and postoperative 
anatomical sex.30  However, other states, like Kansas, may refuse to 
recognize the amended sex designation for purposes of marriage.  
Consequently, any marriage involving a transsexual like J’Noel Ball can 
be alternately valid and void as she and her spouse travel across the 
country. 
This Comment argues that, in most cases, states are constitutionally 
bound to give full faith and credit to laws and judgments rendered in 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Dauner, supra note 12, at A1. 
 27. J’Noel appealed the decision of the Leavenworth District Court, and the Court 
of Appeals of Kansas issued an opinion on the case in May 2001.  In re Estate of 
Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086.  The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions 
that the trial court “consider and decide whether an individual was male or female at the 
time the individual’s marriage license was issued and the individual was married, not 
simply what the individual’s chromosomes were or were not at the moment of birth.”  Id. 
at 1110.  The court noted that the trial court “may use chromosome makeup as one 
factor, but not the exclusive factor, in arriving at a decision.”  Id. 
 28. As of July 1, 2000, a new Vermont law allows same-sex partners to be joined 
in “civil unions.”  See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72, 72–73.  The law was enacted in 
response to the Vermont Supreme Court holding in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 
1999), and seeks to provide eligible same-sex couples the opportunity “to obtain the 
same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex 
couples.”  See Baker, 744 A.2d at 886.  The Vermont legislature took care to distinguish 
“civil unions” from “civil marriages,” however, and defines “marriage” as the “legally 
recognized union of one man and one woman.”  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (Supp. 
2000) (emphasis added). 
 29. For an overview of arguments on both sides, see generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: 
PRO AND CON—A READER (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997). 
 30. See infra Part III.B. 
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sister states, including those that result in changes of the sex designated 
on birth certificates.  The sex designated on the birth certificate controls 
gender identity for all legal purposes of the individual named therein.  
Therefore, unless a forum state demonstrates that allowing transsexuals 
and intersexuals to marry in their legal gender is contrary to an important 
state interest, that state must recognize “opposite-sex” marriages involving 
transsexuals and intersexuals. 
Part II of this Comment sets forth terminology and some general 
information about transsexualism and intersexualism.  Part III examines 
the significance of the birth certificate, why legal changes of sex should 
be granted, and which states currently allow them.  Part IV explains the 
scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as well as its limitations.  Part 
V identifies how the Full Faith and Credit Clause may be a successful 
mechanism for obligating sister states to recognize legally amended sex 
designations on transgendered individuals’ birth certificates.  Part VI 
concludes that once their sexual identity has been legally amended, 
transsexuals and intersexuals have a right to marry in the sex designated 
on their birth certificates and that opposite-sex marriages entered into by 
these individuals should be recognized throughout the United States. 
II.  IDENTIFYING AND UNDERSTANDING THE                                    
TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 
“Transgenderist” is a term used to describe both transsexuals and 
intersexuals.31  A transgendered person is one whose psychological 
sexual identity is opposite from the biological and physical sex that (s)he 
appeared to be at birth.32 
 
 31. For purposes of this Comment, “transgenderist” will refer only to transsexuals 
and intersexuals.  Generally, the term “transgenderist” also encompasses transvestites.  
See MARTHA T. ZINGO, SEX/GENDER OUTSIDERS, HATE SPEECH, AND FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 10 n.17 (1998).  Transvestites, or “cross-dressers,” are people who 
wear the clothes associated with the other sex.  Some do so to obtain 
employment unavailable to persons of their anatomical sex or because cross-
dressing provides pleasure; others do so to express aspects of their identity 
they find inexpressible when dressing and acting in conformance with what is 
socially expected of persons with their anatomy. 
Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 
8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 239 (1998). 
 32. See ZINGO, supra note 31, at 10–11 (citing LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER 
LIBERATION: A MOVEMENT WHOSE TIME HAS COME 6–7 (1992)).  Although often used 
interchangeably, “sex” and “gender” are distinct and independent of each other.  See 
Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 274 (“Most legislation utilizes 
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A.  Intersexuals 
Individuals born with some combination of male and female sexual 
characteristics are classified as intersexual.33  Medical experts recognize 
that a combination of eight factors determine one’s sex: chromosomal 
sex (XY or XX), gonadal sex (testes or ovaries), internal sex organs 
(seminal vesicles and prostate or vagina, uterus and fallopian tubes), 
genitalia (penis and scrotum or clitoris and labia), hormonal sex 
(androgens or estrogens), secondary sex characteristics (facial and 
chest hair or breasts), assigned sex and gender of rearing, and sexual 
identity.34  Intersexuals experience ambiguity between and within these 
eight factors. 
 
the word ‘sex,’ yet courts, legislators, and administrative agencies often substitute the 
word ‘gender’ for ‘sex’ when they interpret these statutes.  Despite the different 
meanings of the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender,’ they are often used interchangeably.”).  Sex is 
“typically defined according to biological factors,” whereas “[g]ender is generally used 
to refer to the cultural or attitudinal qualities that are characteristic of a particular sex.”  
Id. at 273–74.  Sexual identity is how one identifies him or herself biologically, while 
gender identity is how one identifies him or herself socially.  See Nancy R. Nangeroni, 
International Foundation for Gender Education, TransGenderism: Transgressing Gender 
Norms, at http://www.gendertalk. com/tgism/tgism.shtml (last modified Mar. 17, 2001) 
(“If someone is born female, but wishes to see their body as male in all respects, their 
sexual identity is male.” (emphasis added)).  Transsexuals (even those who do not 
undergo sex reassignment surgery (SRS)) have both a sexual and a gender identity 
opposite that which their anatomy at birth would suggest.  Most transvestites, on the 
other hand, do not see themselves emotionally or even physically as the sex as which 
they occasionally dress.  See Coombs, supra note 31, at 239. 
 33. There are many different intersexed medical conditions.  “The most common 
types of intersexuality are congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), androgen insensitivity 
syndrome (AIS), gonadal dysgenesis, hypospadias, and unusual chromosome 
compositions . . . .”  FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 1, at 51.  CAH occurs in XX children 
and is a “[g]enetically inherited malfunction of one or more of six enzymes involved in 
making steroid hormones.” Id. at 52.  The malfunctioning enzyme(s) can cause “mild to 
severe masculinization of genitalia at birth or later; if untreated, can cause masculinization at 
puberty and early puberty.”  Id.   
      AIS occurs in XY children and is caused by a “[g]enetically inherited change in the 
cell surface receptor for testosterone.”  Id.  AIS children are “born with highly feminized 
genitalia.  The body is ‘blind’ to the presence of testosterone, since cells cannot capture 
it and use it to move development in a male direction.  At puberty these children develop 
breasts and a feminine body shape.”  Id.   
     Gonadal dysgenesis has various causes, not all of which are genetic.  Id.  It is a 
“catch-all category,” and refers to any individual whose “gonads do not develop 
properly.”  Id.  Hypospadias also has various causes.  Id.  The basic feature of 
hypospadias is a urethra that “does not run to the tip of the penis.  In mild forms, the 
opening is just shy of the tip; in moderate forms, it is along the shaft; and in severe 
forms, it may open at the base of the penis.”  Id.  For further discussion of the causes and 
features of types of intersexuality see generally DREGER, supra note 1; JOHN MONEY, 
SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO COUNSELING CHILDREN, 
ADOLESCENTS, AND THEIR FAMILIES (2d ed. 1994); Greenberg, Defining Male and 
Female, supra note 5. 
 34. See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 278. 
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A variety of chromosomal combinations have been discovered apart 
from the usual XX (female) and XY (male) karyotypes.35  Individuals 
with chromosomal sex disorders have karyotypes such as: XXX, XXY, 
XXXY, XYY, XYYY, XYYYY, and XO.36  One of the most common 
chromosomal sex disorders is Klinefelter Syndrome.37  Individuals with 
Klinefelter Syndrome have an extra X chromosome.38  Those affected by 
Klinefelter are anatomically male, but their testes and penis are often 
smaller than unaffected males, and some experience breast growth at 
puberty.39  Medical literature reports that most individuals with Klinefelter 
identify themselves as heterosexual men.40 
Some intersexuals experience incongruity between their chromosomal 
sex and their anatomy.  Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS) affects 
about one in 20,000 persons.41  Those affected by AIS are born with XY 
chromosomes and testes, but have the external genitalia of females.42  At 
puberty, AIS individuals develop breasts, but do not menstruate and are 
not fertile.43  Most AIS persons have a female sex and gender identity.44 
 
 35. See id. at 281.  The Intersexed Society of North America (ISNA) estimates that 
“1/500 of the population has a karyotype other than XX or XY.”  See ISNA, Frequently 
Asked Questions: What Is Intersexuality (or Hermaphroditism)?, at http://www.isna.org/ 
faq.html (last visited June 30, 2001). 
 36. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 281. 
 37. Klinefelter Syndrome occurs in approximately “1/500 to 1/1,000 of male 
births.”  ISNA, Frequently Asked Questions: What Is Klinefelter Syndrome?, at 
http://www.isna.org/faq.html (last visited June 30, 2001). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 283.  According to the 
ISNA, however:  
Many ISNA members with klinefelter syndrome are homosexual, a few are 
transsexual, and many experience their gender as quite different from other 
men.  In contrast, medical literature tends to discount any connection between 
klinefelter syndrome and homosexuality or gender issues.  We suspect that 
medical reassurances that ‘your son will not be gay’ are based more on 
homophobia than on an accurate assessment of probabilities.  
ISNA, Frequently Asked Questions: What Is Klinefelter Syndrome?, at http://www. 
isna.org/faq.html (last visited June 30, 2001). 
 41. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 286; see also ISNA, 
Frequently Asked Questions: What Is Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome?, at 
http://www.isna.org/faq.html (last visited June 30, 2001).  Androgen is the “male” sex 
hormone; however, it is present in both men and women.  Id. 
 42. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 286.  AIS individuals 
will have shorter vaginas than typical women and no female reproductive organs.  Id. 
 43. Id. (“Unlike several other intersex conditions, individuals with CAIS 
[complete AIS] almost always are identified as ‘normal’ females at birth because 
externally they are indistinguishable from XX females. . . .  Until puberty, many CAIS 
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Each year approximately 2600 children are born with somewhat 
ambiguous genitalia.45  In the past (and to some extent in the present), 
medical experts would perform surgeries to conform intersexual 
children’s genitals to a more cosmetically acceptable appearance, taking 
little heed of their chromosomal makeup.46  In the United States, an 
estimated 2000 children undergo genital surgery each year.47 
The term “hermaphrodite” has been commonly used to describe 
intersexuals who have ambiguous genitalia.48  According to medical 
 
women have no inkling that they are other than normal XX women.”). 
 44. Id.  However, unlike individuals with CAIS, those with PAIS (partial AIS) 
“may fall anywhere along a spectrum from an almost completely male external 
appearance and male sexual identity to a completely female external appearance and 
female sexual identity.”  Id. at 287. 
 45. Martha Coventry, Making the Cut, MS., Oct.–Nov. 2000, at 52, 55, available 
at http://www.msmagazine.com/oct00/makingthecut.html. 
 46. See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 272–73; see also 
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 1, at 57. 
[M]edical managers employ the following rule: ‘Genetic females should 
always be raised as females, preserving reproductive potential, regardless of 
how severely the patients are virilized.  In the genetic male, however, the 
gender of assignment is based on the infant’s anatomy, predominantly the size 
of the phallus.’ 
 Doctors insist on two functional assessments of the adequacy of phallus size.  
Young boys should be able to pee standing up . . . [and] adult men . . . need a 
penis big enough for vaginal penetration during sexual intercourse. 
Id. (quoting Patricia K. Donahoe et al., Clinical Management of Intersex Abnormalities, 
28 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN SURGERY 519, 527 (1991)); see also ISNA, Recommendations 
for Treatment, at http://www.isna.org/recommendations.html (last visited July 3, 2001) 
(discussing the inadequacy of the treatment model for intersexual infants and children 
that was developed in the 1950s and continues to be adhered to in some hospitals). 
 47. Coventry, supra note 45, at 56.  The ISNA advocates against forcing genital 
surgery on infants and children to conform their anatomy to a typical male or typical 
female appearance.  See ISNA, Recommendations for Treatment, at http://www.isna.org/ 
recommendations.html (last visited July 3, 2001).  The ISNA has proposed a model of 
treatment of intersexual children that “recommend[s] avoidance of harmful or 
unnecessary genital surgery on infants and children.  No surgery should be performed 
unless it is absolutely necessary for the physical health and comfort of the intersexual 
child.”  Id.  The ISNA strongly recommends that all nonessential, cosmetic surgery be 
“deferred until the intersexual child is able to understand the risks and benefits of the 
proposed surgery and is able to provide appropriately informed consent.”  Id. 
 48. The ISNA advocates eliminating the word “hermaphrodite” from medical 
literature.  It argues that the word is not only “stigmatizing,” but also “misleading.”  
ISNA, On the Word “Hermaphrodite,” at http://www.isna.org/hermaphrodite.html (last 
visited July 3, 2001) (“The word ‘hermaphrodite’ implies that a person is born with two 
sets of genitals—one male and one female—and this is something that cannot occur.”).  
Although the idea of two sets of genitals (male and female) is not possible, intersexual 
genitals may have aspects of both male and female genitalia.  See ISNA, Frequently 
Asked Questions: What Is Intersexuality (or Hermaphroditism)?, at http://www.isna.org/ 
faq.html (last visited July 3, 2001) (noting that intersexual genitals can look “truly ‘right 
in the middle,’ with a phallus that can be considered either a large clitoris or a small 
penis, with a structure that might be a split, empty scrotum, or outer labia, and with a 
small vagina that opens into the urethra rather than into the perineum”). 
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literature, there are three categories of hermaphrodites: true hermaphrodites, 
male pseudo-hermaphrodites, and female pseudo-hermaphrodites.49  
True hermaphrodites are rare.50  They have some combination of both 
ovarian and testicular tissue.51  “Pseudo-hermaphrodites have either ovaries 
or testes combined with the ‘opposite’ genitalia.”52  Male pseudo-
hermaphrodites have testicles, but can appear “almost entirely feminine 
internally and externally.”53  Female pseudo-hermaphrodites have ovaries, 
but have “some predominance of the masculine genital parts.”54 
When babies are born with ambiguous genitalia, doctors will assign 
them a sex partly according to sex-role stereotypes.55  Professor Julie A. 
Greenberg has noted this common practice in the medical community: 
A genetic male with an “inadequate” penis (one that is incapable of penetrating 
a female’s vagina) is “turned into” a female even if it means destroying his 
reproductive capacity.  A genetic female who may be capable of reproducing, 
however, is generally assigned the female sex to preserve her reproductive 
capability regardless of the appearance of her external genitalia.  If her 
“phallus” is considered to be “too large” to meet the guidelines for a typical 
clitoris, it is surgically reduced even if it means that her capacity for satisfactory 
sex may be reduced or destroyed.  In other words, men are defined based upon 
 
 49. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 285; see also DREGER, 
supra note 1, at 36–37 (noting that the classification of hermaphrodites as “true” and 
pseudo was based “primarily on the anatomical structure of the gonadal tissue”); 
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 1, at 38. 
 50. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 285; see also DREGER, 
supra note 1, at 37. 
 51. DREGER, supra note 1, at 37; see also FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 1, at 279 
n.19 (describing four categories of “true hermaphroditism” whose members have varying 
combinations of male and female sexual characteristics).  Most true hermaphrodites have 
two X chromosomes, but have a more masculine physique.  Id.  Fifty-five percent of true 
hermaphrodites have a urethra that runs “either through or near the phallus, which looks 
more like a penis than a clitoris. Any menstrual blood exits periodically during 
urination . . . .  The vagina (without labia), which opens above a normal-looking scrotum, is 
often too shallow to permit heterosexual intercourse.”  Id.  Despite an otherwise 
relatively male appearance, however, breasts appear at puberty.  Id.  “Internally, virtually 
all true hermaphrodites have a uterus and at least one oviduct in various combinations 
with sperm transport ducts.”  Id. 
 52. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 1, at 38 fig.2.2.  The ISNA argues that “[t]he 
qualifiers ‘male’ and ‘female,’ because they are based only upon the gonadal histology, 
frequently contradict the sex assignment, and thus are very misleading and disturbing for 
parents and patients.”  ISNA, On the Word “Hermaphrodite,” at http://www. isna.org/ 
hermaphrodite.html (last visited July 3, 2001). 
 53. DREGER, supra note 1, at 145. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 271 (“The 
presence of an ‘adequate’ penis in an XY infant leads to the label male, while the 
absence of an adequate penis leads to the label female.”). 
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their ability to penetrate females and females are defined based upon their 
ability to procreate.56 
Professor Greenberg’s observation demonstrates that, at least for 
intersexuals, sex may be more of a “social construct” than a “biological 
fact.”57 
The mainstream medical advice given to parents of intersexed children 
is to hide their intersexuality from them and to raise them in the sex that 
the doctors assign them.58  However, some intersexuals have rebelled 
against the sex that they were assigned at birth.  Experts have reported 
many cases of intersexuals who undergo sex reassignment surgeries59 to 
construct (or reconstruct) the genitals they feel they should have.60 
While the medical world deals with the reality of intersexuality, 
legislatures and courts have ignored or overlooked intersexuals in 
promulgating laws based on sexual categorization.  Because intersexuals 
do not fit neatly into either a female or male classification, state laws 
that require marriage to be between a man and a woman, but fail to 
define “man” and “woman,” leave intersexuals uncertain as to whom 
they can legally marry. 
B.  Transsexuals 
Unlike intersexuals, transsexuals are not born with chromosomal, 
 
 56. Id. at 271–72. 
 57. Id. at 272.  In recent years, some medical professionals have been advocating 
that doctors take a more thorough approach—one as inclusive as possible of all the 
sexual factors.  See Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Management of 
Intersexuality: Guidelines for Dealing with Persons with Ambiguous Genitalia, 151 
ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 1046 (Oct. 1997), available at 
http://www.afn.org/~sfcommed/apam.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2001). 
 58. See, e.g., FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 1, at 80 (describing the life story of 
Cheryl Chase, founder of the Intersexual Society of North America (ISNA)).  Chase was 
born with ovo-testes, but had an external appearance of a typical female, except for an 
enlarged clitoris.  Id.  She was raised as a boy until she was eighteen months old.  Id.  
“Then, at the advice of physicians, she underwent [a] complete clitorectomy . . . .  Her 
parents changed her name,” and they destroyed all evidence of Chase as a boy.  Id. at 
80–81.  She did not learn her medical history until age twenty-three, when she finally 
convinced a doctor to reveal the contents of her medical records.  Id.   
      In another case, Angela Moreno was forced to undergo a clitorectomy in 1985 at the 
age of twelve under the pretense of the necessity of a hysterectomy due to ovarian 
cancer.  Id. at 84.  Her clitoris had grown to a length of 1.5 inches, which is considered 
unacceptable.  See id. at 59 fig.3.4.  Like Chase, Moreno did not find out the truth of her 
anatomy (that she was XY and orginally had testes, not ovaries) and the 1985 surgery 
until she was twenty-three years old.  Id. at 84. 
 59. See infra Part II.B (describing sex reassignment surgeries). 
 60. See Milton Diamond, & H. Keith Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment at Birth: 
Long-Term Review and Clinical Implications, 151 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & 
ADOLESCENT MED. 298, 300 (Mar. 1997), available at http://www.afn.org/~sfcommed/ 
mdfnl.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 1997). 
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gonadal, or genital ambiguities.61  Rather, transsexuals are individuals 
whose sexual and gender identities are incongruous with the anatomical 
and chromosomal compositions with which they were born.62  In other 
words, transsexuals’ psychological sex and gender, usually from a very 
early age,63 do not correspond to their anatomical and chromosomal 
makeup.  The incidence of transsexualism has been reported to be one in 
10,000 males and one in 30,000 females.64 
The medical classification for transsexualism is “gender dysphoria” or 
“gender identity disorder” (GID).65  GID has been defined as “a strong 
and persistent cross-gender identification, which is the desire to be, or the 
insistence that one is, of the other sex,”66 in conjunction with a “persistent 
discomfort about one’s assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in 
the gender role of that sex.”67  Medical experts have not been able to 
identify the cause of transsexualism, but have attributed it to a “combination 
of neuro-biological, genetic and neonatal environmental factors.”68  One 
recent scientific study, however, identified that the area of the brain 
essential for sexual behavior (called the “BSTc”), which is smaller in 
women than in men, is likewise smaller in male-to-female transsexuals.69 
 
 61. See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 289 & n.160 
(stating that the medical condition with which transsexuals are diagnosed is gender 
identity disorder (GID) and that such a diagnosis is “limited to individuals who do not 
have a related intersex condition” (emphasis added)). 
 62. See MEYERS, supra note 1, at 219–21. 
 63. Many transsexuals claim that they were aware of the conflict between their 
sexual identities and their bodies early in their childhoods.  See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 
9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. App. 1999) (noting that although the plaintiff was born with 
normal male genitalia, she testified that she “considered herself a female from the time 
she was three or four years old”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000). 
 64. Richard Green, Reflections on “Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment” 1969–
1999, Presidential Address at the XVI Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria 
Ass’n Symposium (Aug. 17–21, 1999), in 4 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 1, ¶ 7 (Jan.–Mar. 
2000), at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/greenpresidental/green00.htm. 
 65. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 532–38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter, DSM-IV].  There is a current movement 
among transgendered activists to remove GID from the list of mental disorders in the 
DSM-IV.  See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 289 n.160. 
 66. DSM-IV, supra note 65, at 532. 
 67. Id. at 533. 
 68. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224. 
 69. See Jiang-Ning Zhou et al., A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and Its 
Relation to Transsexuality, 378 NATURE 68, 68 (Nov. 2, 1995) (“A female-sized BSTc 
was found in male-to-female transsexuals. . . .  Our study is the first to show a female 
brain structure in genetically male transsexuals and supports the hypothesis that gender 
identity develops as a result of an interaction between the developing brain and sex 
hormones.”). 
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Tormented by the dichotomy of their state of being, many transsexuals 
seek medical treatment to align their physical selves with their 
psychological identities.  The acronym MTF (male-to-female) is used to 
describe a transsexual who was born with male genitalia, but undergoes 
medical treatment to transition to a female.70  A MTF is considered 
“fully” transitioned once she has undergone hormone treatment and sex 
reassignment surgery (SRS) in which a vagina and labia are constructed.71  
After successful sex reassignment surgeries, MTFs’ genitals have “a 
good cosmetic appearance.”72  They are also able to function sexually as 
females,73 and may even be able to experience vaginal orgasms.74  However, 
they have no uterus, cervix, or ovaries.75  In addition to sex reassignment 
surgery, MTFs undergo surgeries such as breast augmentation, tracheal 
shave (to reduce the adam’s apple), brow and face recontouring, 
rhinoplasty, liposuction, and voice box modification (to make the voice 
 
 70. There has been criticism of this acronym by some transsexuals.  They feel that 
they should not be referred to as “male-to-female” because they have always been 
female.  However, the author will use the acronyms “MTF” and “FTM” (female-to-male) 
in this Comment because they have been widely accepted and widely used by both 
medical experts and legal scholars.  See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 31, at 243; Richard F. 
Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the “Nascent Jurisprudence of Transsexualism,” 4 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 276 n.1 (1997); Rose, supra note 2, at 15. 
 71. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 31, at 242–43.  The surgeries to construct a 
vagina and the outer labia are called vaginoplasty and labiaplasty.  The penis, scrotum, 
and testicles are removed, and the constructed vaginal walls are lined by the skin of the 
penis.  See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 206 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
 72. M.T. v. J.T. 355 A2d. at 206.  Male-to-female sex reassignment surgery has 
developed into  
a highly sophisticated procedure which includes the construction of a very 
sensate Clitoris, well defined Labia Minor and Majora with overlying hood, 
normal appearing pink mucosa between the Clitoris and Urethra Meatus, a 
Urethral opening that is well placed and smooth in its junction between skin 
and mucosa, a well lined Neo-vagina of adequate depth for sexual intercourse 
and in general, a vulva so natural looking that it appears virtually the same as it 
does in the genetic female. 
Eugene A. Schrang, What Results Can Patients Reasonably Expect from a Male to 
Female Sex Reassignment Surgery, in 1 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM (Oct.–Dec. 1997), at 
http://www.symposion.com/ijt/hbigda/vancouver/schrang.htm. 
 73. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d at 206 (“[T]he vagina, though at a somewhat different 
angle, was not really different from a natural vagina in size, capacity and ‘the feeling of 
the walls around it.’”  Plaintiff’s vagina was “the same as a normal female vagina after a 
hysterectomy . . . and she never complained to [her doctor] that she had difficulty having 
intercourse.” (quoting Plaintiff’s doctor, Dr. Charles L. Ihlenfeld)). 
 74. See In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (Civ. Ct. 1968) (“[T]he 
procedure used is to denude the penis by rolling back its epithelial cover and to use this 
invaginated sheath as a sensitive ‘vagina.’  The erotic sensation is retained, and vaginal 
orgasm is made possible.”). 
 75. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d at 206; see also Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, 400 
N.Y.S.2d 267, 271 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (quoting expert testimony that the sex organs of 
a MTF transsexual “resemble those of a female who has been hysterectomized and 
ovariectomized”). 
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higher).76 
“FTM” (female-to-male) describes a transsexual who was born with 
female genitalia, but sees himself as male, and often seeks medical treatment 
to transition to a male.77  The point at which a FTM is considered “fully” 
transitioned is controversial.  The sex reassignment operation for FTMs 
is called phalloplasty.78  However, because phalloplasty is very costly79 
and often unsuccessful,80 many FTMs stop at metoidioplasty.81  Due to a 
lack of success with phalloplasty, some doctors are pushing to have 
metoidioplasty accepted as the sex reassignment surgery for FTMs.82  
Other procedures undergone by FTMs include breast reduction or bilateral 
mastectomy, nipple realignment, and hysterectomy.83 
Transsexualism is independent of sexual orientation.84  While the basis 
of transsexualism is self-identity, the basis of sexual orientation is attraction 
to others.  Sexual orientation describes which sex an individual finds 
erotically arousing.85  Transsexuals who are attracted to the opposite sex 
from which they identify themselves consider themselves heterosexual; 
whereas, transsexuals who are attracted to the same sex with which they 
 
 76. See Cain, supra note 1. 
 77. See Nangeroni, supra note 32. 
 78. Phalloplasty is a procedure whereby a “neophallus” is constructed from 
biological and sometimes nonbiological tissue and surgically attached to the patient.  
James Barrett, Psychological and Social Function Before and After Phalloplasty, 2 INT’L 
J. TRANSGENDERISM 1, ¶ 9 (Jan.–Mar. 1998), at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtc0301. 
htm (stating that “[a] permanently attached structure of biological origin and derived 
from the patient’s body tissues constitutes a neophallus,” and that “[w]hether a 
neophallus incorporates non-biological tissue such as silicone is not important so long as 
it does so in a wholly enclosed and internal way”). 
 79. See Cain, supra note 1 (estimating that phalloplasty costs between $30,000 and 
$50,000 and that, in most cases, the surgery is not covered by health insurance). 
 80. See id.; see also Barrett, supra note 78, ¶ 10 (“Phalloplasty procedures have 
been refined over the years, but major problems remain.  Complication rates are much 
higher if it is intended to create a urinary conduit through the neophallus.”). 
 81. See Cain, supra note 1 (describing metoidioplasty as the “freeing up of the 
hormonally elongated clitoris so that it will extend and appear as a small penis”). 
 82. See id. (“Some doctors are pushing to have this surgery [metoidioplasty] 
accepted as SRS, due to the instability and varying results of a phalloplasty.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 289 (asserting that 
“[t]ranssexualism is not necessarily related to sexual orientation”).  Although sexual 
orientation and gender and sex identity are independent of each other, they are all 
interrelated in that the label one puts on his or her sexual orientation (heterosexual or 
homosexual) depends on one’s self-identity. 
 85. See Nangeroni, supra note 30 (discussing “Sexual Orientation vs. Gender 
Identity vs. Sexual Identity”). 
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identify themselves consider themselves homosexual.86  Thus, an MTF 
who is sexually attracted to men considers herself heterosexual,87 while 
an MTF who is sexually attracted to women considers herself a lesbian.88 
As with intersexuals, the law has left transsexuals uncertain as to 
whom they can legally marry.  Each state determines its own marriage 
laws; therefore, which sex transsexuals can marry varies state to state 
and depends on whether their states of birth and states of marriage allow 
or recognize legal changes of sex.  Because some states allow postoperative 
transsexuals and intersexuals to legally change their sex while other 
states do not,89 a postoperative MTF may enter into a valid marriage to a 
man in some states that would be considered an invalid homosexual 
union in others. 
III.  LEGAL CHANGES OF SEX 
A.  Significance of the Birth Certificate 
The sex designation on an individual’s birth certificate determines an 
individual’s sexual identity for virtually all legal purposes.90  It provides 
the basis for deciding, among other things, whether a person must 
register to be drafted, which prison (s)he may be sent to, and whom (s)he 
may marry.91 
Unless an infant is born with ambiguous external genitalia, the infant’s 
legal sex is determined by a brief inspection of the genitalia, and then 
 
 86. See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 289–90; see also 
Coombs, supra note 31, at 242 (“Gays and lesbians do not necessarily experience gender 
confusion; transgendered people are not necessarily gay, but there are transgendered 
lesbians and transgendered gay men.”)  Despite how transsexuals see their own sexual 
orientation, the law may have a different view.  If state law refuses to recognize 
transsexuals’ postoperative sex, the state would consider a MTF who has sexual 
relationships with men to be gay.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 87. Christie Lee Littleton, the MTF transsexual plaintiff in Littleton v. Prange, 9 
S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999), does not consider herself part of the homosexual 
community.  She has always considered herself a heterosexual woman.  Lisa Gray, XX 
Marks the Spot, HOUSTON PRESS, Sep. 14, 2000, at www.houstonpress.com/issues/2000-
09-14/gray.html. 
 88. Jessica Wicks, a MTF transsexual who was able to marry Robin Wicks, a 
biological female, in Texas in September 2000 because a Texas court of appeals ruled 
that a postoperative female transsexual is still legally a male.  See Gray, supra note 87. 
 89. See discussion infra Part III.B and accompanying notes. 
 90. See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 309 (“Because the 
birth certificate is the first official document to indicate sex, it usually controls the sex 
designation on all later documents.”). 
 91. In Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 (Sup. Ct. 1977), the court 
noted that the sex listed on the birth certificate “may be crucial in school admissions, in 
vocational or recreational opportunities, in military service, in connection with insurance 
and pensions, or upon an application for a marriage certificate.” 
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recorded on the birth certificate.92  Concededly, this rather unscientific 
method is sufficient in the vast majority of cases.93  The medical 
community, however, has become increasingly aware that sometimes it 
is not.94  Those for whom it proves inaccurate must endure the tremendous 
consequences of having a legal identity contrary to their self-identity 
and perhaps their present anatomy.  Many states have dealt with this 
issue legislatively.95  Many others have yet to confront it at all. 
B.  State Laws Regarding Legal Change of Sex 
The circumstances under which transsexuals and intersexuals may 
legally change the sex designated on their birth certificates vary from 
state to state.  Furthermore, some states will issue the applicant a new 
certificate, while others issue an amended version of the original 
certificate.96  In at least ten states, transsexuals and intersexuals may 
petition for a new birth certificate that reflects their postoperative 
anatomy and their psychological sex.97  A few of those states will reissue 
 
 92. See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 271 (“If external 
genitalia appear unambiguous, the external genitalia typically determine the sex 
designated on the birth certificate.”). 
 93. Considering that the incidence of transsexualism and intersexualism are 
relatively low, most of the time, a brief inspection of a newborn’s external genitalia is 
adequate to determine the infant’s sex because the other sex characteristics will be 
harmonious with the external genitalia.  See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, 
supra note 5, at 278 (laying out eight factors that contribute to the determination of an 
individual’s sex and noting that “[f]or most people, th[o]se factors are all congruent”). 
 94. Organizations like the International Foundation for Gender Education (IFGE) 
and the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) as well as many individual medical 
experts, authors, and lawyers have worked to bring the medical, legal, and social 
problems faced by transsexuals and intersexuals to light in recent years.  See, e.g., 
www.ifge.org; www.isna.org. 
 95. See infra Part III.B and accompanying notes. 
 96. There is a distinction between getting a new and an amended birth certificate.  
See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 309 nn.346–47.  If a new 
certificate is issued, the former sex designation will not appear anywhere on the new 
certificate, and the original certificate will be placed under seal, not to be broken except 
by order of a court.  Id. at 309 n.346.  See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-604.01 (1996) 
(stating that “the original certificate of birth shall be available for inspection only upon 
the order of a court of competent jurisdiction”).  On the other hand, if an amended birth 
certificate is issued, it will show the requested sex designation as well as the original 
entry.  See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 309 n.347.  The legal 
effect of the alteration will be the same regardless of whether the certificate is reissued or 
amended. 
 97. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-326(A)(4) (West 1993); CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE §§ 103430, 103425 (West 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 338-17.7(4)(B) 
(1993); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 535/17(1)(d) (West 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
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the birth certificate once the petitioner submits an affidavit by a 
physician stating that the petitioner has undergone sex reassignment 
surgery and that the sex designation on the original certificate is no 
longer accurate.98  The others require the petitioner to obtain a court 
order. 99  In those states, the petitioner must present evidence to a court of 
competent jurisdiction that (s)he desires and intends to live permanently 
as a member of the gender opposite that which is indicated on his or her 
original birth certificate and that (s)he has undergone sex reassignment 
surgery.100  Once the court has had an opportunity to evaluate the evidence 
and question the petitioner, it may order that a new birth certificate be 
issued. 
At least fourteen other jurisdictions will issue an amended birth 
certificate upon proof that the original contains an inaccuracy.101  Again, 
some will do so based on a doctor’s affidavit,102 while others require that 
the petitioner obtain a court order mandating the change.103  Only one 
state specifically forbids any modification of the sex designation for 
individuals who have undergone sex reassignment surgery.104 
 
144.23(3) (West 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:62(A) (West 1992); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 333.2891 (1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-57-21 (Supp. 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 
71-604.01 (1996); N.C. GEN.  STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4) (1999). 
 98. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-326(A)(4) (West 1993); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 338-17.7(4)(B) (1993); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 535/17 (West 1997); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 144.23(3) (West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-604.01 (1996); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4) (1999). 
 99. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 103430, 103425 (West 1996); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:62 (West 1992). 
 100. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:62(C) (West 1992) (requiring proof that 
“sex reassignment or corrective surgery has been properly performed upon the petitioner, 
and that as a result of such surgery . . . the anatomical structure of the sex of the 
petitioner has been changed to a sex other than that which is stated on the original birth 
certificate of the petitioner”). 
 101. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-9A-19(d) (1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-307(d) 
(2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-115(4) (West 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-217(d) 
(1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-23(e) (Harrison 1998); 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 3222(e) 
(LEXIS through 2000 legislation); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-214(b)(5) (2000); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46 § 13 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
193.215(9) (West Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.12 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 24-14-25(D) (Michie 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 432.235(4) (1999); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 26-2-11 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-269(E) (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
69.15 (West 1999). 
 102. See, e.g., 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 3222(e) (LEXIS through 2000 legislation); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46 § 13 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001). 
 103. See ALA. CODE § 22-9A-19(d) (1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-307(d) (2000); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-23(e) (Harrison 1998); MD. CODE  ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-
214(b)(5) (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.12 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 
432.235(4) (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-2-11 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-269(E) 
(Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 69.15 (West 1999). 
 104. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (1996) (“The sex of an individual will not 
be changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.”). 
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Other states have not enacted statutes that specifically address changes 
of sex in the cases of individuals who have undergone sex reassignment.  
Many jurisdictions have laws that provide for corrections in cases in 
which birth certificates contain an error or inaccuracy,105 but whether 
that language entitles transsexuals and intersexuals to amend their 
official sex designations depends on how the courts interpret it.  
Transsexuals have tested such ambiguously worded statutes in only a 
handful of jurisdictions.106  The majority of those cases were resolved 
against the petitioner; however, most of them were decided over twenty-
five years ago.107   
Many of the expert opinions that courts relied upon to determine 
whether a postoperative transsexual should be recognized as male or 
female are outdated.108  The current trend in the medical community is to 
recognize and classify postoperative transsexuals as the sex to which 
they have been “reassigned.”109  How states choose to classify the sex of 
transsexuals and intersexuals is admittedly up to them rather than the 
medical authorities.  However, where states have failed to define sex and 
have not made clear the circumstances under which the sex designation 
on a birth record may be changed, courts faced with transsexual and 
intersexual petitioners should consider the current medical research in 
 
 105. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 191.028(b) (West 2001) 
(permitting an amendment if the certificate “is incomplete or proved by satisfactory 
evidence to be inaccurate”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.15 (West 1998) (permitting 
correction of a birth record where it “has not been properly and accurately recorded”). 
 106. See infra Part III.B.1–5. 
 107. See cases discussed infra Part III.B.1–5. 
 108. For example, see Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966), in 
which the court relied on a 1965 study of transsexuals conducted by the Committee on 
Public Health of the New York Academy of Medicine.  The Committee had concluded 
that transsexuals should not be granted a change of sex on birth certificates because they 
remain the same chromosomal sex even after undergoing surgical alteration of other 
aspects of their sex.  See id. at 321–22.  Currently, medical experts consider eight factors 
in determining sex (chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, internal morphologic sex, external 
morphologic sex, hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, assigned sex/gender of rearing, and 
gender identity), rather than basing their determination simply on chromosomal sex.  See 
Julie A. Greenberg, When Is a Man a Man, and When Is a Woman a Woman?, 52 FLA. L. 
REV. 745, 753–54 (2000) [hereinafter Greenberg, When Is a Man a Man]. 
 109. See Storrow, supra note 70, at 281 n.17 (citing Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus. Inc., 
626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395–96 (Sup. Ct. 1995), as having determined, “given ‘overwhelming 
medical evidence,’ that transsexuals become their psychological sex once sex 
reassignment is complete”); see also Greenberg, When Is a Man a Man, supra note 108, 
at 754–55 (discussing that the medical experts who testified in a recent Texas case 
involving a postoperative MTF “indicated that they, and other medical authorities, 
recognize that Christie is medically a woman”). 
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deciding whether the petitioner’s sex is “inaccurate.” 
The following discussion of cases involving transsexuals who petitioned 
for changes of sex on their birth certificates are grouped according to 
state to demonstrate the different approaches taken by the jurisdictions 
that have had to interpret ambiguous birth record amendment statutes.  
Understanding how the following courts arrived at their conclusions 
sheds light on how courts of other jurisdictions may analyze similarly 
ambiguous statutes.110 
1.  New York 
Since 1966, New York courts have consistently denied petitions by 
transsexuals for changes of sex on their birth certificates. 111  In New 
York, applications for legal changes of sex must be submitted to the 
Bureau of Vital Records and Statistics of the Department of Health for 
approval.112  After the Department of Health passed a resolution in 
1965113 that the Health Code would “not be amended to provide for a 
change of sex on birth certificates in cases of transsexuals,”114 the 
Bureau of Vital Records refused to make any amendments requested by 
 
 110. All of the cases dicussed infra involve transsexuals, not intersexuals.  The 
author’s research has not turned up any cases involving intersexual petitioners.  
Intersexuals, however, are in an even stronger position to demand changes of sex on their 
birth certificates than transsexuals—whether a court interprets a statute as requiring the 
sex designation to have been inaccurate at the time of birth or simply requires a present 
discrepancy, intersexuals should be able to meet either requirement.  Intersexuals can 
more readily demonstrate that the sex which they were assigned at birth was inaccurate 
at the time.  For example, an intersexual who was born with ambiguous genitalia and 
whom the doctors assigned to be female may argue that the doctors simply were 
wrong—what the doctors considered an usually large clitoris was actually a small penis.  
On the other hand, transsexuals have clearly male or female anatomies at birth, so they 
are left with two difficult legal arguments: (1) convince the court that self-identity is the 
determining factor of sex and that because they have always had a self-identity opposite 
their assigned sex, their sex designation was inaccurate at the time it was made, or (2) 
convince the court that it should determine sex based on present anatomy and self-
identity rather than chromosomes. 
 111. See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 311 (noting that 
the first case in New York to test the right of transsexuals to change the sex designated 
on their birth certificates was decided in 1966).  However, prior to 1965, three 
transsexuals had been able to obtain legal changes of sex without resorting to filing a 
legal claim.  See Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
 112. See Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 321. 
 113. The resolution was based on a report submitted by the Committee on Public 
Health of the New York Academy of Medicine in which the Committee voiced its 
opposition to changes of sex on birth certificates for transsexuals.  See id. at 322.  The 
Committee concluded that it was opposed to changes of sex because “1.  male-to-female 
transsexuals are still chromosomally males while ostensibly females; 2.  it is questionable 
whether laws and records . . . should be . . . used as a means to help psychologically ill 
persons in their social adaption.”  Id. 
 114. Id. (quoting the resolution passed by the Board of Health on Oct. 13, 1965). 
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transsexuals.115  Each time a transsexual has appealed to the court, the 
court has deferred to the decision of the director of the Bureau of Vital 
Records, reasoning that, as long as the director did not act in an “arbitrary, 
capricious or otherwise illegal manner,”116 the court is without power to 
overrule his decision.117 
By 1977, at least one New York court questioned the wisdom behind 
the Department of Health’s rule denying legal sex status changes for 
postoperative transsexuals.118  The report that the Department of Health 
relied on in passing its 1965 resolution concluded that “[t]he desire of 
concealment of a change of sex by the transsexual is outweighed by the 
public interest for protection against fraud.”119  Although the Anonymous 
v. Mellon120 court still deferred to the decision of the Bureau of Vital 
Records,121 it stated that it would regard the concern of fraud “as being 
of virtually no significance, since it is dubious that any one would go 
through such drastic procedures . . . for the purpose of deceiving creditors 
or avoiding the draft.”122  Furthermore, the court questioned the 
Department’s reliance on chromosomes as the determining factor of a 
person’s legal sex.123 
2.  Connecticut 
No specific Connecticut statute addresses changes to designations of 
 
 115. See cases cited infra note 117. 
 116. See Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 323. 
 117. See id. (“Judicial deference to the decision of those members of the Board of 
Health who are physicians or otherwise uniquely qualified appears mandatory in the 
singular circumstances here involved.”); see also Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 
99, 103 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (denying petition because director of Bureau of Vital Records 
“did not act arbitrarily, unreasonably or illegally in declining to designate petitioner’s 
sex”); Hartin v. Dep’t of Health, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (denying 
petition because “the power of regulating birth certificates lies solely within the 
jurisdiction of the Board of Health, and the rules thereon are shown to have a rational 
basis”); In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (Civ. Ct. 1968) (declining to rule on a 
change of sex on the birth certificate of a transsexual because it did not have jurisdiction 
over the Department of Health for that purpose). 
 118. See Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 102. 
 119. Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 322. 
 120. 398 N.Y.S.2d. 99 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
 121. See id. at 102–03. 
 122. Id. at 102. 
 123. Id. (“It has been judicially determined that chromosomal or genetic sex is not 
the determinative factor in deciding whether a person is male or female.  The fact is that 
no single characteristic is determinative.” (citing Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, 400 
N.Y.S.2d 267, 271–73 (Sup. Ct. 1977))). 
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sex on birth certificates,124 but under Connecticut law, the Commissioner 
of Health has the power to make such changes pursuant to his general 
authority over birth records.125  In Darnell v. Lloyd,126 a postoperative 
MTF transsexual sued the Commissioner of Health over his refusal to 
change the sex designation on her birth certificate from male to 
female.127  The court denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary 
judgment, concluding that if Darnell is able to establish that she is 
“presently female,”128 she may be granted the change.129  The court said 
that the Commissioner must show “some substantial state interest in his 
policy of refusing to change birth certificates to reflect current sexual 
status,”130 and that “[s]o far the defendant has shown no state interest in 
this policy whatsoever.”131 
3.  Oregon 
K. v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources132 has been 
essentially overturned by a statutory provision expressly permitting sex 
designation changes for postoperative transsexuals.133  However, the 
case is still relevant to understanding how courts go about analyzing 
unclear statutes because, at the time of K., the pertinent Oregon statutes 
did not specifically address amending sex designations on birth certificates.134  
In K., a lower court granted a FTM postoperative transsexual’s petition 
for a new birth certificate listing his sex as “male” over the objections of 
the State Board of Health.135  The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding 
 
 124. General Statutes of Connecticut section 19a-42 addresses the amendment of 
vital records and states that vital records “may be amended only in accordance with 
sections 19a-41 to 19a-45, inclusive.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-42 (1997 & Supp. 2001).  
None of those sections deal with changes in designations of sex.  CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 
19a-41 to 19a-45 (1997). 
 125. See Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F.Supp. 1210, 1213 (D. Conn. 1975) (agreeing that 
the Commissioner “has the power to make changes other than those specifically 
authorized by statute under his general mandate to supervise birth records”). 
 126. 395 F.Supp. 1210 (D. Conn. 1975). 
 127. Id. at 1211. 
 128. Id. at 1214. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. 560 P.2d 1070 (Or. 1977). 
 133. OR. REV. STAT. § 432.235(4) (1999) (“Upon receipt of a certified copy of an 
order of a court of competent jurisdiction indicating that the sex of an individual born in 
this state has been changed by surgical procedure . . . the certificate of birth of such 
individual shall be amended . . . .”). 
 134. See K. v. Health Div., Dep’t of Human Res., 560 P.2d at 1071–72 (citing a 
number of Oregon statutes, none of which specifically address sex designation changes). 
 135. Id. at 1070–71 (noting that the lower court not only granted K’s petition for 
change of name, but also ordered that a new birth certificate be issued designating K’s 
sex as male rather than female). 
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that a birth certificate should show the facts as they presently exist.136  
However, the Supreme Court of Oregon found it “at least equally, if not 
more reasonable,”137 that the intent of the legislature in enacting the 
statutes was that a birth certificate be a “historical record of the facts as 
they existed at the time of birth.”138  It reversed the Court of Appeals, 
and questioned whether the courts, rather than the executive body to 
whom the power to regulate such issues has been delegated, even have 
the power to decide the legislature’s intent.139 
4.  Ohio 
Ohio law provides that individuals who claim their registration of 
birth “has not been properly and accurately recorded,” may file an 
application to correct the inaccuracy in probate court.140  In In re 
Ladrach,141 a postoperative MTF transsexual filed a request for declaratory 
judgment that her birth certificate be amended to list her sex as female 
and that a license for her to marry a man be issued.142  The court 
interpreted the Ohio statute to be “strictly a ‘correction’ type statute,”143 
and refused to order the requested modification.144 
5. Puerto Rico 
The Puerto Rico Supreme Court recently permitted a postoperative 
MTF transsexual to change the sex designated on her birth certificate to 
female.145  Her case had been pending for six years.146  The majority 
decision called transsexualism “an evident reality that demands a legal 
solution.”147  The dissent acknowledged that the decision permits the 
 
 136. Id. at 1071–72. 
 137. Id. at 1072. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. (“In our opinion, it is not for this court to decide which view is 
preferable. . . .  [I]t is by no means clear that it was the ‘apparent’ much less ‘manifest’ 
intent of the Oregon legislature in enacting ORS 432.135 to confer such broad powers 
upon the courts of this state.”). 
 140. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.15 (West 1998). 
 141. 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987). 
 142. See id. at 829–30. 
 143. Id. at 831. 
 144. Id. at 832. 
 145. See Ivan Roman, Court Gives Gay-Rights Activists Hope, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
July 17, 2000, at A6, available at 2000 WL 3614188. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. (quoting Justice Antonio Negron Garcia writing for the majority). 
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transsexual to be “a woman for all legal purposes,”148 including marriage.149 
C.  The Bottom Line 
Generally, when courts face ambiguously worded laws, they turn to 
legislative intent and public policy to interpret their meaning.  The courts 
in New York, Connecticut, Oregon, Ohio, and Puerto Rico all faced laws 
that were ambiguous as to how they applied to individuals who had 
undergone sex reassignment operations.  The courts could not look to 
legislative intent because their legislatures had not addressed, or in all 
likelihood even contemplated, the application of the laws for transsexuals 
and intersexuals.  Therefore, the courts had to interpret the laws based on 
their ascertainment of public policy. 
  State courts ascertain public policy by examining their state’s statutes, 
common law, and traditional social mores and practices.150  With no 
common law or statutory definitions of male and female, 151 courts must 
turn to social tradition.  However, tradition addressing which sex post-
SRS individuals should be recognized as is almost nonexistent.  This is 
because the medical technology that has enabled transsexuals and 
intersexuals to “fully” transition152 is relatively new.153  Furthermore, public 
knowledge of transsexualism and intersexualism has been very limited.  
The transgendered community has only recently become recognizable 
enough to make the public take notice of their civil and human rights 
issues.154  The combination of all of the above factors makes public 
 
 148. Id. (quoting Justice Francisco Rebollo Lopez) (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. (“This turns Andres Andino into a woman for all legal purposes, being able 
to get married as a woman, since the marriage certificate would establish that in an 
official manner.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Bldg. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 
532, 537–38 (1950) (“The public policy of any state is to be found in its constitution, 
acts of the legislature, and decisions of its courts.  ‘Primarily it is for the lawmakers to 
determine the public policy of the State.’” (quoting Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding 
Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 (1931))); Sirois v. Sirois, 50 A.2d 88, 89 (N.H. 1946) 
(stating that public policy “may be found in the common law or in a local statute”); 
Taliaferro v. Rogers, 248 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951) (locating public policy 
in “the constitution, legislative enactment[s] or judicial decision[s]” of a state). 
 151. One court has suggested a “simple formula” for determining sex.  In re 
Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 837 (Civ. Ct. 1968).  The court proposed, “Where . . . 
the psychological sex and the anatomical sex are harmonized, then the social sex or 
gender of the individual should be made to conform to the harmonized status of the 
individual.”  Id.  Further, it recommended that “if such conformity requires changes of a 
statistical nature, then such changes should be made.”  Id. 
 152. See supra notes 71–72, 78 and accompanying text for explanations of what full 
transitions entail. 
 153. Sex reassignment surgery started to become more common in the 1950s.  
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 1, at 306 n.93. 
 154. Activist organizations (such as the Intersex Society of North America, the 
International Foundation for Gender Education, and the Harry Benjamin International 
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policy difficult to ascertain. 
At this point, three things are clear: (1) the sex designated on one’s birth 
certificate controls one’s sexual identity for all legal purposes, including 
marriage; (2) almost half of the states in the United States have 
legislatively recognized what the medical community recognized years 
ago, namely, that chromosomes are not the determinative factor of one’s 
sex; and (3) when courts in states which do not have decisively worded 
statutes must determine whether a transsexual can have a legal change of 
sex, they have little or no precedent or discernable public policy on 
which to base their determinations. 
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE POWER AND CONSTRAINTS OF THE FULL 
FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE 
The legal anomaly transsexuals and intersexuals face when they leave 
their states of birth is that their legal sex may change, and with it, their 
legal rights.  For example, after 1994, while J’Noel Ball was in Wisconsin, 
she was, for all legal purposes, a woman.155  However, while J’Noel was 
in Kansas, according to a Kansas probate court, she was, for all legal 
purposes, a man.156  Therefore, while in Wisconsin, if J’Noel wanted to 
enter a golf tournament, for example, she could only play in the 
women’s division; if convicted of a crime, she could only be sent to a 
women’s prison; and if she wanted to marry, she could only marry a 
man.  But while in Kansas, she could only enter the men’s division, only 
be sent to a men’s prison, and only marry a woman.  An anomaly of this 
nature is exactly what the Full Faith and Credit Clause was intended to 
resolve. 
The purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as explained by the 
Supreme Court,157 is “to alter the status of the several states as independent 
foreign sovereignties,”158 and to make them “integral parts of a single 
 
Gender Dysphoria Association) are responsible for raising awareness among the general 
public in recent years through the use of the internet, see www.isna.org; www.ifge.org, 
www.hbigda.org; mainstream magazines such as People, see Tresniowski et al., supra 
note 1, and Ms., see Coventry, supra note 45; and academic journals like the International 
Journal of Transgenderism, see Green, supra note 64. 
 155. J’Noel Ball’s sex designation was changed on her birth certificate from male to 
female in 1994.  See supra text accompanying notes 24–25. 
 156. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
 157. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). 
 158. Id. at 277. 
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nation.”159  Thus, the Clause is a means to “resolve controversies where 
state policies differ.”160  It accomplishes that purpose by requiring 
enforcement of the legislative measures and common law of one state by 
all states in the nation. 
The Constitution states that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in 
each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every 
other State.”161  The Supreme Court has established that this constitutional 
mandate is self-executing,162 which means that, on its face, the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause restricts the forum court’s ability to apply its own law 
where it would conflict with a law or judgment of a sister state.163  
However, the Full Faith and Credit Clause has never been interpreted to 
apply absolutely. 164  The following exceptions are the two most likely to 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 553 (1947). 
 161. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  In addition to the constitutional mandate, in 1790 
Congress prescribed: 
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, 
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States 
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts 
of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).  Courts have relied on both the Constitution and the 1790 Act 
in deciding full faith and credit cases.  See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriages 
and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of An Experiment in Full Faith and 
Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409, 414–15 (1998–1999). 
 162. See, e.g., Rensberger, supra note 161, at 414–15 & n.14; Julie L. B. Johnson, 
Comment, The Meaning of “General Laws”: The Extent of Congress’s Power Under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611, 1619–20 & nn.41, 43 (1997).  But see, e.g., Ralph U. Whitten, 
The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of 
Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998–1999) (arguing that an analysis of 
historical evidence reveals that the first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was 
meant to have only an evidentiary effect); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional 
Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1 
(1981); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A 
Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process 
Clauses (Part One), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (1980–1981). 
 163. See, e.g., Rensberger, supra note 161, at 414–15 & n.14. 
 164. The language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not contain any 
limitations on its face; nevertheless, the effect of the Clause may be limited under four 
circumstances.  See Hamilton, supra note 6, at 954–65 (discussing the procedural matter 
and public policy exceptions).   
    (1) The Improper Jurisdiction Exception.  To be entitled to full faith and credit, a 
judgment must be final and must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction 
over the subject matter and the persons governed by it.  See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (stating that a judgment that meets jurisdictional requirements 
“qualifies for recognition throughout the land”).  State courts are not required to enforce 
judgments where the rendering court did not have the requisite jurisdiction.  For a 
discussion on how to determine whether a court has proper jurisdiction see, for example, 
Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where 
It’s Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313, 320–21 (1997) [hereinafter Strasser, Judicial Good 
Faith].  
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pose an obstacle for transsexuals and intersexuals seeking interstate 
recognition of their amended sex designation. 
A.  The Public Policy Exception 
Supreme Court precedent has established that the full faith and credit 
mandate does not apply if a law, record, or judgment of a sister state 
would violate the public policy of the forum state.165  Currently, the 
public policy exception is the most likely hindrance to using the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause to demand interstate recognition of sex 
designation changes for transsexuals and intersexuals.  This is true 
because courts have had broad discretion to exercise the public policy 
exception.166  However, the breadth of that discretion may be shrinking. 
The availability of the public policy exception depends on whether the 
forum court is faced with a law or a judgment of a sister state.167  The 
 
    (2) The Procedural Matters Exception.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause applies only 
to substantive laws.  See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726–27 (1988).  The 
Clause does not require states to “adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, 
manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments.”  Baker, 522 U.S. at 235.  Thus, if the 
forum court determines that the nature of the dispute is procedural, it is not required to 
apply the laws or judgments of its sister state.  See id.; see also Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 726–
27.   
     (3) The Public Policy Exception.  See infra Part IV.A.  
     (4) The Statutory Exception.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 165. See, e.g., Strasser, Judicial Good Faith, supra note 164, at 317–20; Hamilton, 
supra note 6, at 957. 
 166. Legal commentators have noted that the public policy exception was originally 
intended to be construed narrowly and used infrequently.  See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex 
Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 
YALE L.J. 1965, 1971–73 (1997) (citing Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 
1918), as evidence of the intended narrowness and relative unimportance of the public 
policy exception); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. at 202 (“The courts are not free 
to refuse to enforce a foreign right . . . unless [enforcement] would violate some 
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-
rooted tradition of the common weal.”); see also Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex 
Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 935 (1998); Kaleen S. 
Hasegawa, Casenote, Re-Evaluating the Limits of the Full Faith and Credit Clause After 
Baker v. General Motors Corporation, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 747, 776 (1999) (concluding 
that “[t]he exception is meant for rare circumstances when the foreign judgment is 
undesirable or contrary to the important public policy of the forum” (emphases 
added)).  These commentators concede, however, that over the years courts have so 
frequently exercised broad discretion to use the public policy exception and to lower 
the threshold of what violates public policy that their discretion and the lower 
threshold have become the rule rather than an abuse of power.  See Kramer, supra, at 
1973. 
 167. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, 
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full faith and credit obligation is more “exacting”168 as applied to 
judgments.169  A forum state may refuse the full faith and credit mandate 
only in “exceptional circumstances”170 where the foreign judgment is 
“‘obnoxious’ to an overriding policy of its own.”171  In some cases, the 
forum court must give full faith and credit “even to hostile policies 
reflected in the judgment of another State.”172 
Recently, in Baker v. General Motors Corp.,173 the Supreme Court 
reiterated the limited scope of the public policy exception as applied to 
judgments.174  Baker involved a wrongful-death complaint, but the case 
turned on whether a state court has the authority to order a witness not to 
testify in any court of the United States.175  Ultimately, the case was not 
decided on the public policy exception issue,176 so the Court’s discussion 
of the issue is dicta.  However, the fact that the Court “went out of its 
way”177 to address the public policy exception reveals the approach it is 
likely to take if faced with the issue in the future.178 
The Court addressed the public policy exception issue because the 
lower court in the Bakers’ wrongful-death suit “misread [its] precedent”179 
by “assuming the existence of a ubiquitous ‘public policy exception.’”180  
Justice Ginsburg stated that courts may turn to their state’s public policy 
for guidance in determining the law applicable to the controversy before 
them, but emphasized that the Court’s past decisions “support no roving 
‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and credit due judgments.”181  
Thus, in all likelihood, Baker has limited the breadth of discretion that 
courts have previously enjoyed. 
The Supreme Court has been less vigilant in enforcing full faith and 
credit when the forum state faces a statute it deems violative of public 
 
Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 307, 
321–22 (1998) [hereinafter Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster]; Hasegawa, 
supra note 166, at 764–65; Johnson, supra note 162, at 1628. 
 168. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 426 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948). 
 173. 522 U.S. 222 (1998). 
 174. Id.; see Hasegawa, supra note 166, at 770. 
 175. Baker, 522 U.S. at 225–26. 
 176. See Hasegawa, supra note 166, at 763 (stating that the Court held that 
Michigan’s judgment “was not entitled to full faith and credit because it interfered with 
Missouri’s control of litigation brought by parties who were not before the Michigan 
court”). 
 177. Id. at 751. 
 178. See id. at 752. 
 179. Baker, 522 U.S. at 234. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 233. 
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policy.  The Court has stated that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does 
not obligate a state “to substitute the statutes of other states for its own 
statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent 
to legislate.”182  However, a forum court cannot refuse to enforce a sister 
state’s law merely because it differs from its own.183  The forum court 
must demonstrate that the foreign law is contrary to a strong public policy 
of its state.184 
B.  The Statutory Exception 
Congress may be able to restrict the application of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause by passing laws that enable states to ignore the full faith 
and credit mandate where it would otherwise be applicable.  The second 
sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause states: “Congress may by 
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”185  Prior to 1996, 
Congress had exercised that power on three occasions, but only to clarify 
or extend the full faith and credit mandate, never to limit it.186  The 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 187 which was passed in the wake of 
Baehr v. Lewin,188 is Congress’s first attempt to restrict the application 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
 
 182. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939). 
 183. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 498 A.2d 605, 608 
(Md. 1985) (“[M]erely because Maryland law is dissimilar to the law of another 
jurisdiction does not render the latter contrary to Maryland public policy and thus 
unenforceable in our courts.”); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 
1918) (“[T]he mere fact that we do not give a like right is no reason for refusing to help 
the plaintiff . . . .  We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is 
wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.”). 
 184. See Strasser, Judicial Good Faith, supra note 164, at 320; Strasser, Baker and 
Some Recipes for Disaster, supra note 167, at 321. 
 185. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 186. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994 & Supp. 2001) (full faith and credit given to 
protection orders); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994 & Supp. V 2000) (full faith and credit 
given to child custody determinations); 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994 & Supp. V 2000) (full 
faith and credit given to child support orders); Johnson, supra note 162, at 1613. 
 187. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C 
(Supp. V 2000); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 2000)). 
 188. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  The Supreme Court of Hawaii found that a state 
statute restricting marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples constituted sex-based 
discrimination, see id. at 60, and remanded the case to a lower court to determine 
whether the state could demonstrate that the statute furthered a compelling state interest 
and was narrow enough to avoid unnecessary constitutional deprivations.  See id. at 68.  
At stake in the Baehr case was the potential legality of same-sex marriages in Hawaii. 
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The effect of DOMA is twofold.  First, it creates a federal definition of 
the word “marriage” limiting it to “a legal union between one man and 
one woman as husband and wife.”189  Second, it allows states to sidestep 
the whole public policy issue by explicitly providing that a state is not 
required to recognize same-sex marriages that may have been validly 
performed in a sister state.190 
Although the constitutionality of DOMA may be challenged in the 
future, 191 as the law now stands, the Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot 
compel a state to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in a 
sister state.  Significantly, however, Congress failed to fill an important 
definitional void in enacting DOMA.  Although the Act provides federal 
definitions of “marriage”192 and “spouse,”193 it does not offer criteria to 
determine who is a “man” and who is a “woman.”  DOMA leaves 
unanswered what constitutes an “opposite-sex” couple.  Therefore, 
transsexuals and intersexuals are still left to guess which of their unions 
will be considered opposite-sex and which will be considered same-sex, 
and how that may change depending on which state they move or travel to. 
The fact that DOMA exists demonstrates that statutory exceptions to 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause are, for the time being, possible.194  
Thus, a federal statute defining male and female and authorizing states to 
ignore the Clause’s mandate as to sex designation amendments validly 
made in sister states is likewise possible.  However, such a law is not 
probable in the near future.  The biggest obstacle for the transgendered 
 
 189. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 2000). 
 190. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. V 2000).  
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be 
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any 
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between 
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such 
other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such 
relationship. 
Id.; see also Hasegawa, supra note 166, at 769; Johnson, supra note 162, at 1612–13. 
 191. Various commentators have urged that DOMA is unconstitutional.  See, e.g., 
Hamilton, supra note 6, at 987 (concluding that “[n]ot only is Congress’s abrogation of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause unauthorized by the text and history of that clause, but 
its passage of DOMA also fails to comport with the requirements imposed by the 
Supreme Court cases interpreting the clause”); Johnson, supra note 162, at 1640 (arguing 
that “DOMA does not look like the sort of legislation that was intended by the term 
‘general Laws’”).   But see Rensberger, supra note 161, at 411 (“I believe that the Act is 
within Congress’ power and that it is a largely sensible solution to the problems of 
interstate federalism.”). 
 192. 1 U.S.C § 7 (Supp. V 2000) (restricting the word “marriage” to “a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife”). 
 193. Id. (stating that the word “spouse” refers “only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife”). 
 194. Exceptions are possible “for the time being” because future litigation may prove 
(or may not) that DOMA is unconstitutional. 
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community in obtaining interstate recognition of sex designation 
changes remains the public policy exception. 
V.  APPLYING THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE TO COMPEL 
INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF CHANGES OF SEX ON BIRTH 
CERTIFICATES 
The full faith and credit mandate broadly applies to all “Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”195  Therefore, if State B 
authorizes an amendment to a transsexual or intersexual’s birth certificate, 
State A may be bound to recognize the new or amended record and the 
resulting legal sex status of that individual.  Unless Congress enacts a 
statutory exception,196 the extent of State A’s obligation to recognize an 
amended birth certificate will depend on (1) whether State A has a 
discernible and important public policy, and (2) whether the change was 
made pursuant to a statute or a judgment. 
A.  Public Policies Against Legal Changes of Sex 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires a forum state to recognize 
and enforce a law or judgment of one of its sister states even if its own 
law does not provide a like right.197  In other words, State A cannot 
refuse to recognize a legal change of sex validly rendered in State B just 
because its own laws would not permit the change to its citizens’ birth 
certificates.  A state court cannot avoid enforcing the law or judgment of 
a sister state unless it identifies an “important rather than a merely 
legitimate state interest”198 for doing so.  In other words, the public 
policy exception will not be applicable unless the forum state has a clear, 
legitimate, and substantial public policy against sex designation changes. 
1.  The Fraud Issue 
One issue overshadowing the public policy discussion is the 
government’s interest in protecting the public against fraud.  The 
prevention of fraud has long been a foremost public interest.  Fraud 
concerns regarding transsexuals and intersexuals range from whether 
 
 195. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 196. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 197. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 198. Strasser, Judicial Good Faith, supra note 164, at 319. 
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allowing a change in legal identity would enable them to elude 
creditors,199 to whether it would allow them an unfair advantage in 
competitive athletic events,200 to whether it would provide a loophole 
through the same-sex marriage prohibitions.201 
Although fraud is a legitimate concern when legal identity changes are 
at issue, it is extremely unlikely that the intent behind undergoing a sex 
reassignment is to dupe society.  The hormone treatments, sex reassignment 
surgeries, and other attending surgeries to which transsexuals and 
intersexuals submit themselves are too drastic and expensive to realistically 
believe that the intent behind undergoing them is to perpetuate a fraud.202  
Furthermore, in the case of intersexuals, the real deception may have 
been perpetrated at birth by the assignation of the wrong sex to the infant. 
The issue of fraud as related to transsexuals has previously been 
addressed by the courts in two areas—sports and change of name cases.203  
For the most part, courts have found that recognizing transsexuals as 
their postoperative gender does not pose a fraud problem.  Examining 
 
 199. See Rose, supra note 2, at 48 (“The accusation that someone will attempt 
gender reassignment for no other reason than a small financial gain is often made . . . .”). 
 200. Some professional sports associations and the International Olympic 
Committee were sufficiently concerned with men posing as women to gain a competitive 
advantage that they made chromosome testing mandatory for participating athletes.  See 
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 1, at 1–3 (noting that the International Olympic Committee 
began chromosome screening of Olympic athletes in 1968).  The story of spanish hurdler 
Maria Patiño illustrates the tragic results of relying purely on chromosomes to determine 
an individual’s sex.  Ms. Patiño, although unaware of the fact, had Androgen 
Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS), and, therefore, had an XY karyotype despite the fact that 
her external genitalia, secondary sex characteristics, and sex and gender identity were 
clearly female.  Id. at 1–2; see also Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, 
at 273 (citing Alison Carlson, When is a Woman Not a Woman, WOMEN’S SPORTS & 
FITNESS, Mar. 1991, at 24–29.).  When a sex chromatin test revealed that Ms. Patiño had 
a Y chromosome, she was banned from competing in the World University Games in 
1985, as well as from the 1988 and 1992 Olympics.  See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 
1, at 1–3; see also Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 273. 
 201. See Rose, supra note 2, at 48 (“[T]he direct contention that transsexuals have 
no goal in mind other than an end run around same-sex marriage proscriptions has been 
asserted.” (citing Tim Fleck, What’s in a Name (and Sex) Change?, HOUSTON PRESS 
ONLINE, at http://houston-press.com/issues/1999-06-17/columns.html (June 17, 1999)). 
Tim Fleck interviewed a Baptist pastor in Texas who “alleges that some court approvals 
of changes of names and sex were being obtained to provide a legal fig leaf for same-sex 
marriages.”  Fleck, supra.  
 202. See Rose, supra note 2, at 6 n.8. 
No one wakes up one morning and says, ‘Gee.  I think that from now on I will 
willingly choose to become part of one of the most misunderstood minorities 
in America.  I want to make my life more difficult by confusing and perhaps 
losing the love of my family and friends.  I want to be subjected to hate crimes 
and employment discrimination.  I want to go through the physical and financial 
pain of obtaining sex reassignment surgery.’ 
Id. (quoting transgender rights activist Sarah DePalma, Press Release, TGAIN, Littleton 
Update (Jan. 14, 2000) (on file with Katrina C. Rose)). 
 203. See infra Parts V.A.1.a–b. 
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the negligible risk of fraud in these areas will demonstrate that it is 
likewise not a legitimate public policy concern in the area of legal 
changes of sex. 
a.  Sports 
In the late 1970s, Dr. Renee Richards204 sought an injunction against 
the U.S. Tennis Association (USTA) to prevent its reliance on a chromosome 
test to determine her eligibility to compete in the women’s bracket of the 
U.S. Open Tennis Tournament.205  Richards is a MTF transsexual who 
underwent a sex reassignment operation about two years before her case 
came to trial.206  Richards argued that the sex-chromatin test207 was 
“arbitrary and capricious and d[id] not have a rational basis.”208  The 
USTA insisted that “there is a competitive advantage for a male who has 
undergone ‘sex-change’ surgery.”209   
The court acknowledged that the defendant’s motivation for instituting 
the sex-chromatin test was “to assure fairness of competition among the 
athletes.”210  However, the court was more impressed by the opinions of 
Richards’ medical experts.211  The surgeon who performed Richards’ SRS 
testified to the effect that Richards did not have an unfair advantage over 
other women because “[h]er muscle development, weight, height and 
 
 204. Renee Richards’ former name was Richard H. Raskind.  Richards v. U.S. 
Tennis Ass’n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 267 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
 205. Id. at 268. 
 206. Id. at 267. 
 207. The test is also called the “Barr body test.”  Id. at 268.  It determines the 
presence of a second X chromosome, which would indicate the person tested is a normal 
female.  See id.  Although the court only discussed the test as it pertains to transsexuals, 
such a test poses an even greater risk of injustice for intersexuals who have anomalous 
sex chromosome patterns.  For example, the sex-chromatin test would determine that an 
XO individual is not female because she lacks a second X chromosome, despite the fact 
that XO individuals have female genitalia, a uterus, and female secondary sex 
characteristics.  See Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 5, at 284 & 
n.110.  Some XO females, with proper hormonal treatment and in vitro fertilization of a 
donor egg, have been able to carry a child to term.  See id. at 284 n.110. 
 208. Richards, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 268. 
 209. Id. at 269. 
 210. Id. at 269 (quoting an attorney for the USTA). 
 211. The court cited the opinions of Dr. Robert Granato, the surgeon who 
performed Richards’ SRS; Dr. Leo Wollman, who stated he had treated over 1700 
transsexual patients including Richards; Dr. Donald Rubbell, Richards’ gynecologist; 
and Dr. John Money, a psychologist who has written extensively on transsexualism.  See 
id. at 271. 
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physique fit within the female norm.”212  Furthermore, the court seemed 
to accept the doctors’ contentions that Richards, “[f]or all intents and 
purposes, . . . functions as a woman.”213  The court stated: “When an 
individual . . . finds it necessary for his own mental sanity to undergo a 
sex reassignment, the unfounded fears and misconceptions of defendants 
must give way to the overwhelming medical evidence that this person is 
now female.”214  The court concluded that the sex-chromatin test “should 
not be the sole criterion” for determining sex, and granted Richards’ 
application for a preliminary injunction.215  Richards thereby secured the 
right to play in the women’s division of the U.S. Open Tennis 
Tournament.216 
b.  Change of Name 
At common law, an individual could assume any name “absent fraud 
or an interference with the rights of others.”217  Most states that have 
codified a name change procedure have retained the common law 
standard, adding only that a court of jurisdiction must approve such 
changes.218  The courts that have dealt with transsexual petitioners have 
uniformly expressed that prohibiting fraud is the “primary purpose”219 of 
change of name statutes.220  Generally, as long as transsexuals and 
intersexuals who seek to change their names satisfy the court that the 
change will not lead to “fraud, misrepresentation, confusion, deception 
or otherwise interfere with the rights of the public,”221 the change will be 
granted. 
Courts have tended to measure the risk of fraud by how far along the 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. (quoting Dr. Money).  Dr. Money described Richards as “a female who has 
been hysterectomized and ovariectomized.”  Id.  He also testified that “her external 
organs and appearance, as well as her psychological, social and endocrinological makeup 
are that of a woman.”  Id. 
 214. Id. at 272. 
 215. Id. at 273.  The court implied that other factors, such as external genital and 
somatic appearance, gonadal status, and psychological identity, should be considered.  
See id. at 272. 
 216. Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and 
Judicial Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 330 (1999). 
 217. In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (Civ. Ct. 1968) [hereinafter 
Anonymous I]. 
 218. See, e.g., id. (stating that the “provisions establishing judicial procedure for 
change of name are in addition to, and not in substitution for, the common law methods 
of change” (quoting In re Shipley, 205 N.Y.S.2d 581, 586 (Sup. Ct. 1960))). 
 219. In re McIntyre, 715 A.2d 400, 402 (Pa. 1998). 
 220. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Goodman, 676 A.2d. 234, 236 (Pa. 1996). 
 221. In re Anonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d 548, 548 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (citing Shipley, 205 
N.Y.S.2d 581) [hereinafter Anonymous II]. 
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individual is in the transition process.222  Many jurisdictions will grant a 
transsexual’s petition for name change even if the transsexual is not fully 
transitioned, as long as the individual has demonstrated a permanent 
commitment to living as a member of the opposite sex.223  Generally, 
courts will not deny petitions for name changes solely because a 
transsexual has not completed sex reassignment surgery.224  More than 
one jurisdiction has reasoned that not granting the change of name 
requested by a transsexual is more likely to defraud the public than 
granting it.225 
The effects of a legal name change are less significant than the effects 
of a legal sex change in that legal rights do not flow from a name, only 
social perceptions do.  As a result, jurisdictions that permit both name 
and sex changes have more stringent requirements for the latter than for 
the former.226  Despite those differences in procedure and effect, the 
 
 222. See, e.g., Anonymous I, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (granting a change of name from 
a male name to a female name because petitioner was a male transsexual who had a sex 
reassignment operation and was “anatomically and psychologically a female in fact”). 
 223. See, e.g., In re Eck, 584 A.2d 859, 860–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) 
(granting a name change to a transsexual who had been successfully living as a female 
and taking female hormones for two years, but who had not yet undergone sex 
reassignment surgery); In re Harris, 707 A.2d 225, 227–28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) 
(rejecting the trial court’s interpretation of the law as “unnecessarily narrow” because it 
held that absent sex reassignment surgery, a transsexual may not be granted a name 
change and stating that “the better reasoned approach is to require such a petitioner to 
demonstrate that he or she is permanently committed to living as a member of the 
opposite sex”). 
 224. See Eck, 584 A.2d at 860–61; Harris, 707 A.2d at 227.  But see Anonymous II, 
587 N.Y.S.2d at 548 (denying application for change of name from an obvious male 
name to an obvious female name because petitioner did not “corroborate this claim by 
competent medical and psychiatric evaluation, including whether he is a transvestite or a 
transsexual and, if a transsexual, whether he has undergone a sex change operation and is 
now anatomically and psychologically a woman”). 
 225. See Harris, 707 A.2d at 228 (“[R]ather then [sic] perpetrating a fraud upon the 
public, the name change would eliminate what many presently believe to be a fraud; that 
is, that petitioner is a man.”); see also Anonymous I, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (“[T]he 
probability of so-called fraud . . . exists to a much greater extent when the birth 
certificate is permitted . . . to classify this individual as a ‘male’ when, in fact, . . . the 
individual comports himself as a ‘female.’”); In re McIntyre, 715 A.2d 400, 403 (Pa. 
1998) (addressing the petition of a preoperative MTF and finding that “there is no public 
interest being protected by the denial of Appellant’s name change petition”). 
 226. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 33.410 (1999) (“The change of name shall be 
granted by the court unless the court finds that the change is not consistent with the 
public interest.”) with OR. REV. STAT. § 432.235(4) (1999) (“Upon receipt of a certified 
copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction indicating that the sex of an 
individual born in this state has been changed by surgical procedure and whether such 
individual’s name has been changed, the certificate of birth of such individual shall be 
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types of fraud involved in legal name and sex changes are similar 
enough to invoke comparison.  The outcomes of most change of name 
cases involving transsexuals demonstrate that courts have not found the 
risk of fraud substantial enough to deny requested changes.227  Likewise, 
risk of fraud should not weigh heavily in a court’s consideration of 
whether to recognize a change of sex on a transsexual or intersexual’s 
birth certificate.228 
2.  Discerning Policy from Little Precedent 
Aside from the fraud factor, public policy may be found in a state’s 
constitutions, statutes, common law, and traditions.229  Unless a state has 
amended its statutory laws to expressly allow or disallow legal changes 
of sex for those who have undergone SRS, public policy cannot be 
discerned from its statutes.  Furthermore, public policy cannot be found 
in most states’ common law given that only a handful of states have 
addressed the issue as to transsexuals,230 and no states have documented 
cases involving intersexuals.231 
If a court can find no guidance in the laws of the forum state, it must 
 
amended . . . .”). 
 227. See, e.g., Anonymous I, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (addressing and dismissing the 
probability of fraud as a result of changing a postoperative MTF’s name from one that is 
obviously male to one obviously female); McIntyre, 715 A.2d at 403 (finding “no public 
interest being protected by the denial of Appellant’s name change petition”); Harris, 707 
A.2d at 228 (disagreeing with the trial court’s determination that permitting a name 
change would be unfair to the general public and stating that “a legal name change 
would actually prevent the daily confusion and public confrontations which presently 
plague petitioner’s dealings with the public”). 
 228. At least one jurisdiction, New York, has already explicitly dismissed fraud as a 
factor in change of sex designation cases describing the risk as “of virtually no 
significance, since it is dubious that any one would go through such drastic procedures as 
sex reassignment surgery for the purpose of deceiving creditors or avoiding the draft.”  
Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
 229. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra Part III.B.1–5.  Precedent in two jurisdictions, Ohio and New York, 
demonstrates that legal changes of sex for postoperative transsexuals are against state 
public policy.  See supra Parts III.B.1, B.4 and cases cited therein.  Recently, Texas also 
refused to recognize a postoperative MTF transsexual as legally female, stating that 
“[b]iologically a postoperative female transsexual is still a male.”  Littleton v. Prange, 9 
S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. App. 1999).  The Littleton court interpreted the pertinent Texas 
Health and Safety Code section to mean “inaccurate as of the time the certificate was 
recorded; that is, at the time of birth,” id. at 231, despite the fact that the actual wording 
of the statute makes it ambiguous as to transsexuals and intersexuals because it does not 
specify whether the record had to be inaccurate at the time it was made, or inaccurate 
given the physical and hormonal changes the petitioner has since undergone.  See TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 191.028(b) (Vernon 2001) (permitting amendment to 
the sex designation on the birth certificate if petitioner demonstrates that the record “is 
incomplete or proved by satisfactory evidence to be inaccurate”). 
 231. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
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discern public policy through the traditions and social mores of the state.  
Here, courts have greater latitude to find an opposing public policy.  For 
example, a court could conclude that chromosomes have traditionally 
been the determinative factor of sex, and, therefore, that the state has a 
public policy against changing the sex designation of an individual 
whose current designation matches his or her chromosomal structure. 232  
Another example is that a court could identify a policy that birth 
certificates are intended as historical records only, and not as reflections 
of current states of being.233  Accordingly, the court could conclude that 
the state’s policy does not allow amendments that reflect changes due to 
sex reassignment operations. 
The common law in New York, Ohio, and Texas,234 as well as the 
statutory law in Tennessee,235 demonstrate that those states have public 
policies against sex designation changes for individuals who have 
undergone sex reassignment operations.  Thus, transsexual and 
intersexual citizens of those states will probably not be able to change 
their birth certificates.  Other states, when confronting the issue, may 
also discern public policies against such changes from their traditional 
values or practices.   
Determining that a certain right does not exist in the forum state due to 
public policy, however, is only the first step to using the public policy 
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Simply demonstrating 
that a like right does not exist in the forum state does not justify the 
state’s refusal to enforce the law or judgment of a sister state.236  The 
forum state must show that the foreign law or judgment is hostile to an 
important public policy.237  Furthermore, the circumstances under which 
the exception is available are narrowed by the law-judgment distinction 
clearly annunciated in Baker.238  Therefore, if the forum state has a  
conflicting public policy, the court must examine the relative importance 
of that policy, and whether the birth certificate was amended pursuant to 
 
 232. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (Sup. Ct. 1966); In re 
Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 830–32 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987). 
 233. See, e.g., K. v. Health Div., Dep’t of Human Res., 560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Or. 
1977); Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231. 
 234. See supra Parts III.B.1, B.4 and text accompanying note 228. 
 235. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (1996) (“The sex of an individual will not be 
changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.”). 
 236. See Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster, supra note 167, at 321. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See supra Part IV.A. 
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a foreign law or a foreign court’s judgment before the public policy 
exception is available. 
3.  Intersexuals 
It is important to note that public policy may differ if the petitioner is 
an intersexual rather than a transsexual.239  In states that claim to have a 
public policy that sex is determined by chromosomes, certain intersexuals 
may not be precluded from changing their legal sex because their 
chromosomal composition is not decidedly male or female.  For example, 
if a postoperative MTF intersexual with Klinefelter Syndrome240 petitions 
State A to recognize that her birth certificate now indicates that she is 
female, and State A has a policy of determining sex according to whether 
an individual has two X chromosomes, State A would be hard pressed to 
argue that recognizing the petitioner as female violates its public policy. 
Similarly, states that have declared a “once a man, always a man” 
policy,241 would have to significantly stretch that policy to block 
recognition of legal sex changes of petitioners who were born with 
ambiguous genitalia.  For example, if H was born with aspects of both 
male and female genitalia, and as an infant was assigned to the female 
sex, but as an adult underwent SRS to construct (or reconstruct) male 
genitalia, the forum state would have a difficult time justifying how 
recognizing H as a male would be contrary to its policy.  These 
examples illustrate that the use of the public policy exception may be 
even further limited in cases involving intersexual petitioners. 
B.  Foreign Laws v. Forum State Public Policy 
Sex designation changes made pursuant to a state law without a court 
order242 are more vulnerable to the public policy exception because the 
credit owed to laws is weaker than that owed to judgments.243  The Full 
Faith and Credit Clause does not require the forum state to substitute the 
 
 239. Thus far, all of the birth certificate amendment cases in the United States have 
dealt with transsexuals. 
 240. Individuals with Klinefelter Syndrome have an XXY karyotype.  See supra 
notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
 241. See, e.g., In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 831–32 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987); 
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230–31 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 242. Recall that some states have passed statutes allowing the requested amendment 
to be made by a clerk pursuant to a physician’s affidavit that petitioner had successfully 
undergone sex-reassignment surgery.  See supra notes 98, 102 and accompanying text. 
 243. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1998) (“Our 
precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and common law) 
and to judgments. . . .  Regarding judgments, . . . the full faith and credit obligation is 
exacting.”). 
BROWN.DOC 3/3/2020  9:05 AM 
[VOL. 38:  1113, 2001]  Sex Changes and “Opposite-Sex” Marriage 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1151 
laws of a sister state for its own.244  Accordingly, Tennessee would 
probably not be obligated to recognize a birth certificate that has been 
amended pursuant to a foreign law that allows individuals who have 
undergone SRS to change their sex designation.245 
Although the credit owed laws is less exacting than that owed 
judgments, the forum court cannot simply disregard a foreign law.  The 
court must first find that the law is in fact “obnoxious” to an important 
public policy of the forum state. 246  Therefore, in the states that do not 
have a conflicting statute, the scope of the public policy exception 
should be narrowly construed.247  The mere fact that a sex designation 
change would not be allowed in the forum state is not sufficient grounds 
for a court to refuse to enforce a change made pursuant to a sister state’s 
law. 
C.  Foreign Judgments v. Forum State Public Policies 
As discussed earlier, more than half of the states that have passed laws 
enabling transsexuals and intersexuals to amend the sex designation on 
their birth certificates require a court order to affect the change.248  
Therefore, many sex designation changes are the result of judgments.  A 
court may not invoke the public policy exception to avoid enforcing a 
final judgment from another state.  Recently in Baker, the U.S. Supreme 
Court declared that “[its] decisions support no roving ‘public policy 
exception’ to the full faith and credit due judgments,”249 and that in 
assuming that the exception could be used to resist recognition of sister 
states’ judgments the lower courts had “misread [its] precedent.”250  As a 
 
 244. See id. at 232 (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel ‘a state to 
substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter 
concerning which it is competent to legislate.’” (quoting Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. 
Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939))). 
 245. See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 502 (holding that where a 
foreign law is directly at odds with a law of the forum state, the mandate of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause does not apply); Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 
294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935) (noting that there would be an “absurd result” if a forum state 
had to enforce a sister state’s laws, rather than its own). 
 246. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 507 (1941). 
 247. See Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster, supra note 167, at 322 
(stating that the “obnoxiousness exception [should] be read narrowly”). 
 248. See supra notes 99, 103 and accompanying text. 
 249. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). 
 250. Id. at 234.  Furthermore, the Court said it was “aware of [no] considerations of 
local policy or law which could rightly be deemed to impair the force and effect which 
the full faith and credit clause and the Act of Congress require be given to [a] judgment 
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result, when a transsexual or intersexual’s birth certificate has been 
amended pursuant to a court order in his or her birth state (State B), and 
that individual later petitions State A to recognize his or her new sex 
designation,251 the forum court in State A will be obligated in most 
cases, 252 under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to recognize the 
individual as his or her new legal sex. 
VI.  THE RIGHT OF THE TRANSGENDERED TO MARRY 
The Supreme Court has clearly established that the freedom to marry 
is a fundamental personal right.253  As the law stands, the right to marry 
hinges on an individual’s legal sex, and the birth certificate controls the 
legal sex of an individual.  It follows that a valid opposite-sex marriage 
can be created as long as the birth certificate of one spouse indicates 
male, and the birth certificate of the other indicates female.254 
A.  Recognition in All States of Marriages Celebrated in States               
that Allow Sex Designation Changes 
In states that authorize legal changes of sex, a marriage between a 
transsexual and a nontranssexual of the opposite sex is a valid opposite- 
sex marriage.255  For example, if an MTF transsexual or intersexual has 
 
outside the state of its rendition.”  Id. (quoting Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 
U.S. 430, 438 (1943)). 
 251. Circumstances under which an individual may ask a court in State A to 
recognize his or her amended sex designation include when the individual wishes to 
obtain a marriage license from State A or wants State A to recognize his or her marriage 
for any purpose for which standing to sue requires spousal status (claims on intestate 
spouse’s estate or wrongful death claims, for example.). 
 252. The rendering court must have had “adjudicatory authority over the subject 
matter and persons governed by the judgment” for the judgment to qualify for 
recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. 
 253. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 254. In Texas, two couples, in which one of the partners is a postoperative MTF 
transsexual, have been issued valid marriages licenses because the transsexuals’ birth 
certificates still indicated that they were men.  See John W. Gonzalez, Lesbians Legally 
Exchange Vows, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 17, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24511924; 
John Gutierrez-Mier, 2 More Women Obtain County Marriage License: 1 Member of 
New-Mexico Pair Born a Man, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 21, 2000, available 
at 2000 WL 27329428.  The state reasoned that theirs were legal opposite-sex marriages, 
despite the appearance of being same-sex marriages, because their birth certificates 
indicated that within each couple there was a legal male and a legal female.  Gutierrez-
Mier, supra.  Both Robin Manhart and Jessica Wicks (formerly Grady Roland Wicks) of 
Houston and Cynthia Young and Lori D. Killough (a postoperative MTF) of Corrales, 
New Mexico obtained marriage licenses through the Bexar County clerk’s office in 
September 2000.  Id.   
 255. One court has acknowledged that once a state grants a sex designation change, 
that state must recognize the right of that individual to marry in the new sex.  In re 
Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (“It seems obvious . . . that if a state 
BROWN.DOC 3/3/2020  9:05 AM 
[VOL. 38:  1113, 2001]  Sex Changes and “Opposite-Sex” Marriage 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1153 
had her birth certificate amended pursuant to a law or judgment of State 
B, then in State B she will be able to enter into a valid marriage with a 
man.256  On the other hand, a union between herself and a woman would 
be an invalid same-sex union. 
Three constitutional provisions seem to ensure that a valid marriage 
between a legally female transsexual and her male spouse will not be 
confined to the state in which it was celebrated—(1) the right to marry, 
(2) the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and (3) the right to travel.   
First, the right to marry is an established fundamental right.  As noted 
earlier, same-sex marriage is prohibited by both the federal and state 
governments,257 so the right to marry hinges on whether one’s partner is 
of the opposite sex.  To know whether one’s partner is of the opposite 
sex, one must first determine his or her legal sex.  The birth certificate 
has been the traditional means of establishing legal identity; therefore, 
the sex designation on the birth certificate provides a consistent starting 
point.  However, if an individual’s legal identity can be alternately male 
and female as that person crosses state lines due to varying public 
policies regarding transsexuals and intersexuals, that person’s right to 
marry becomes as elusive as his or her sexual identity.  The legal 
identity of the transgendered must be uniformly enforced across the 
nation to preserve their right to marry. 
Second, the Full Faith and Credit Clause was designed to “make [the 
 
permits such a change of sex on the birth certificate of a postoperative transsexual, either 
by statute or administrative ruling, then a marriage license, if requested, must issue to 
such a person provided all other statutory requirements are fulfilled.”). 
 256. In two states, courts have declared the marriages between postoperative 
transsexuals and their opposite-sex spouses valid.  See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 210–
11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (“If such sex reassignment surgery is successful and 
the postoperative transsexual is . . . thereby possessed of the full capacity to function 
sexually as a male or female, as the case may be, we perceive no legal barrier, 
cognizable social taboo, or reason grounded in public policy to prevent that person’s 
identification at least for purposes of marriage to the sex finally indicated.”); 
Transgender Ruling, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 26, 1997, at 1 (reporting Orange County 
Superior Court case, Vecchione v. Vecchione, Civ. No. 96D003769, in which the court 
denied a motion brought by the estranged wife of a postoperative FTM transsexual to 
declare their marriage an invalid same-sex union because “California recognizes the 
postoperative gender of all transsexual persons”).  Both of these cases were decided 
without reference to birth certificates because both New Jersey and California law 
authorize sex designation changes for postoperative transsexuals, but the cases illustrate 
that recognizing marriages involving transsexuals as opposite-sex marriages has been 
done before. 
 257. See supra notes 28, 189–190 and accompanying text. 
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states] integral parts of a single nation.”258  The Clause is a means of 
preserving transsexuals’ and intersexuals’ right to marry in that it 
requires other states to recognize the sex designated on their birth 
certificates and consequently, to recognize their rights as members of 
that sex.  Once an MTF transsexual is legally recognized as female 
pursuant to a law or judgment of her birth state, other states should not 
be able to declare her marriage to a man void.  In recognizing her as 
female, they must also consider her union an opposite-sex marriage. 
Third, the constitutional right to travel also affords protection to 
transsexuals and intersexuals seeking recognition of their marriages in 
states other than the ones where they were celebrated.259  The right to 
travel is not explicitly stated in the Constitution, but the Court has 
interpreted it to be part of the “equal protection framework.”260  By 
1972, the U.S. Supreme Court had declared the right to travel an 
“unconditional personal right,”261 and warned that infringement of that 
fundamental right is unconstitutional absent a clear showing of a 
compelling state interest.262  Subsequently, the Court found statutes 
denying “basic necessities of life” to new residents unconstitutional.263  
According to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, marriage qualifies as such 
a necessity.264  Therefore, a marriage involving a transsexual or 
intersexual that was validly entered into in one state should be 
recognized in every other state, so as not to impinge on the fundamental 
right of that couple to travel. 
 
 258. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935). 
 259. See Harold P. Schombert, Baehr v. Lewin: How Far Has the Door Been 
Opened? Finding a State Policy for Recognizing Same-Sex Marriages, 16 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 331, 343 (1995) (analyzing the right to travel as a means of affording 
protection to “[p]arties seeking recognition of same-sex marriages in states other than 
where they are solemnized” (emphasis added)).  Although Schombert focuses on same-
sex marriages, his right to travel argument can be applied with equal, if not greater, force 
to couples in which one of the spouses is transgendered. 
 260. See id.; see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757–58 (1966) (“[F]reedom 
to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the 
Constitution.”). 
 261. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 341–42 (1972) (striking down a Tennessee 
one-year residency voting requirement and declaring that “[a]bsent a compelling state 
interest, a State may not burden the right to travel” by imposing a penalty on those who 
choose to exercise that right). 
 262. Id. 
 263. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974) 
(striking down a durational residency requirement for state medical care as an 
impediment on the right to travel); see also Schombert, supra note 259, at 344. 
 264. See cases cited supra note 6.  The Court has called marriage “one of the vital 
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”  Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
BROWN.DOC 3/3/2020  9:05 AM 
[VOL. 38:  1113, 2001]  Sex Changes and “Opposite-Sex” Marriage 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1155 
B.  Marriages Sought in States that Do Not Allow 
 Sex Designation Changes 
Again, in every state, whether two people can enter into a valid 
marriage depends on whether they are of the opposite sex.265  If an MTF 
transsexual undergoes SRS, petitions that her birth certificate be 
amended to reflect her postoperative anatomy, and is granted the sex 
designation change, she will be recognized as a woman in that state.  If 
she subsequently moves to a different state and later seeks a license to 
marry a man, that state should be compelled under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause to recognize her as a woman and to issue the marriage 
license to that couple as it would any other opposite-sex couple, 
regardless of whether it would have granted the sex designation change 
itself. 
J’Noel Ball has a strong case for the enforcement of the full faith and 
credit obligation because the sex designation on her birth certificate was 
changed to female by order of a Wisconsin court well before her 
marriage to Marshall Gardiner in Kansas.266  The full faith and credit 
obligation regarding judgments is “exacting,”267 and “the eligibility of a 
person to contract marriage must be determined from the conditions 
existing on the date of the solemnization of the marriage.”268  On appeal, 
J’Noel argued that the trial court erred by “failing to give full faith and 
credit to [her] Wisconsin birth certificate.”269  The Court of Appeals of 
Kansas, however, found that the trial court had not erred in giving her 
birth certificate little or no weight.270   
The court ultimately skirted the full faith and credit mandate by 
turning to a Wisconsin statute dealing with the evidentiary weight of 
vital statistic records.271  The Wisconsin statute that the court relied upon 
essentially states that an amended birth certificate is not prima facie 
 
 265. Of course states have other requirements besides sex (like age and no family 
relationship), but these are not the focus of this Comment and will therefore not be 
considered. 
 266. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 267. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). 
 268. Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 275 P. 987, 988 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929). 
 269. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1107 (Kan. App. 2001). 
 270. Id. at 1109. 
 271. Id. at 1108–09 (stating that “[e]ven if it is assumed that J’Noel’s amended birth 
certificate must be given full faith and credit in Kansas, it is a well-established rule of 
law that Kansas must give the amended certificate only as much recognition or weight as 
would Wisconsin”). 
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evidence of the facts stated in the birth certificate.272  The court, 
therefore, reasoned that Kansas need not give an amended birth 
certificate any greater evidentiary weight than Wisconsin would give it, 
and held that the trial court was free to determine the evidentiary value 
of the amended birth certificate itself.273 
In choosing to side step the full faith and credit issue, the Court of 
Appeals of Kansas failed to set important precedent as to transsexuals’ 
and intersexuals’ right to marry.  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case with directions 
that the trial court reconsider whether J’Noel was a female at the time of 
her marriage to Marshall under the criteria set forth by Professor 
Greenberg.274  Unfortunately, however, the appellate court’s decision 
still leaves transsexuals and intersexuals without a bright line test to 
determine which of their marital unions will be unchallengeable. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Many individual rights, such as the right to marry, stem from a 
person’s legal sex status.  Because neither the state nor federal 
governments have defined the terms “male” and “female,” or “man” and 
“woman,” perhaps under the mistaken notion that such meanings are 
obvious, many transsexuals and intersexuals are uncertain whom they 
have the right to marry and whether their marriages will be valid if they 
leave the states in which they were solemnized.  The Full Faith and 
Credit Clause should be used as a tool to eliminate some of this 
uncertainty by requiring states to recognize sex designation changes 
made pursuant to a law or judgment of a sister state. 
Although some states may oppose and prevent sex designation 
changes within their own borders, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
they should be obligated to recognize the changes granted by their sister 
states, as well as the opposite-sex marital unions that follow.  The 
 
 272. Id. at 1109.  The court quoted the entire subsection: 
Any certified copy of a vital record or part of a vital record issued under this 
subsection shall be deemed the same as the original vital record and shall be 
prima facie evidence of any fact stated in the vital record, except that the 
evidentiary value of a vital record filed more than one year after the event 
which is the subject of the vital record occurred or of a vital record which has 
been amended shall be determined by the judicial or administrative agency or 
official before whom the vital record is offered as evidence. 
Id. (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 69.21(1)(c) (West Supp. 2000) (emphases added)). 
 273. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d at 1109. 
 274. Id. at 1110 (stating that those factors are chromosome makeup, “gonadal sex, 
internal morphologic sex, external morphologic sex, hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, 
assigned sex and gender of rearing, and sexual identity”); see also Greenberg, Defining 
Male and Female, supra note 5, at 278. 
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mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is consistent with the U.S. 
federal system of government and consistent with preserving the 
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